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[Federal] legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain
of rights appertaining to life, liberty, and property, defining
them and providing for their vindication. That would be to
establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private
rights between man and man in society. It would be to make
t The author would like to thank Robert Post, Judith Resnik, Reva Siegel, and
the members of the Yale Constitutional Law Seminar for their comments on earlier
drafts.
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Congress take the place of the State legislatures and to su-
persede them.
-Justice Joseph Bradley'
The first major housing legislation in the United States, the
United States Housing Act of 1937,2 part of the New Deal, was in-
tended to remedy a severe housing shortage, particularly for the ur-
ban poor.3 Though it was amended and supplemented nearly a
hundred times in the next several decades, it created from its incep-
tion a system that implicated multiple levels of governance. Since
that time, the federal government has developed public housing policy
in the United States, while state and local governments have directed
that policy's implementation. Taken together, the structural scheme
for public housing has relied upon a high degree of cooperation among
the governmental layers.
4
Alongside the structure of the public housing program, federal,
state, and local governments are all engaged in efforts to ensure ac-
cess to these programs. The concept of "fair housing" entered poli-
cymaking vocabulary in the late 1960s when legislators recognized
integrated neighborhoods as critical components for ending race-based
discrimination.5 The Fair Housing Act s which outlawed discrimina-
tion in both public and private housing, was the centerpiece of this
discussion, though some states had their own fair housing laws far
earlier.7 Twenty years after the first Fair Housing Act came into ef-
fect, Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 19888 to
expand the scope of the original federal legislation. Like their struc-
1. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
2. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1974)).
3. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937)
(codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1974)).
4. See generally Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG
STATES AND LocAL GOVERNMENTS 66 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991)
(discussing the difficulties of separating state from federal spheres in recent years).
5. See Drew S. Days, III, Rethinking the Integrative Ideal: Housing, 33 McGEORGE
L. REV. 459, 462-65 (2002); John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Hous-
ing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1998).
6. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
7. See 114 CONG. REC. S2530-32 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1968) (statement of Sen. Tyd-
ings) (summarizing fair housing legislation in twenty-three states as of September 1,
1967). In Illinois, the legislature enacted the State Housing Act of 1933, codified as
amended at 310 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-5/47 (2008 & Supp. 2014), to provide for the estab-
lishment of a State Housing Board, with specific powers to study housing needs and
conditions throughout the state, to prepare programs for the correction of such
conditions.




tural counterparts, these federal fair housing laws were promulgated
at the national level but enforced in local settings.9
Despite the introduction of these major pieces of legislation
designed to "provide . . . for fair housing throughout the United
States,"10 housing was not made available on an equal playing field
for all in need. In 1974, Congress eliminated statutory language that
had prohibited discrimination by public authorities against the recipi-
ents of housing subsidies.1 1 Although that language was brought
back in 1988 to give low-income residents equal access, in a repeat
performance in 1998, Congress eliminated the protection a second
time.
12
This Article analyzes how public housing policy has developed in
the United States by examining two areas within the public housing
scheme: (1) the policies governing the provision and administration of
low-income housing programming ("structural policies"); and, (2) the
policies prohibiting discrimination by landlords against prospective
low-income tenants ("antidiscrimination policies"). The former are
well-entrenched policies through which the federal, state, and local
governments regularly work together and communicate about the cre-
ation and implementation of structural policies. In that way, struc-
tural housing policies are the paradigm case for proponents of
federalism as an effective, cooperative model for governance. Antidis-
crimination policies, on the other hand, are both highly indeterminate
in their form and difficult to characterize with respect to their interac-
tions across federal and subfederal actors. As a general matter, since
the New Deal, the federal government has promulgated structural
policies, while states and localities have implemented them, whereas
antidiscrimination policies have been initiated at all levels.13
9. This was done in concert with local and state laws already in force. For a dis-
cussion of the federal fair housing laws in practice, see, Jean Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair
Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149 (1969). See also
Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provisions of the
1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 59 (1993).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
11. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
12. Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242, 105
Stat. 1815 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.);
Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and Indepen-
dent Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998) (repealing
1988 amendment's antidiscrimination provision at 42 U.S.C § 12705a).
13. Importantly, when examining which level of government controls or ought to
control either set of policies, one must differentiate between the promulgation of a rule
or scheme on the one hand, and the actual enforcement or implementation of the rule or
scheme on the other.
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This Article presents a data set that defies the models of federal-
ism-old and new. The progressive federalists of today emphasize the
potentialities of local governance.14 After briefly reviewing the feder-
alist models in menu-like fashion, I argue that policymakers address-
ing fair housing for people with low incomes, an area of unknown or
overlapping sovereignty15 open to local, state, and federal governance,
have failed to maximize these potentialities. In so doing, the Article
shifts the narrative from models to analyses for policymaking pur-
poses. It has been acknowledged that multiplicity is part of federal-
ism in which sometimes local communities and states compete and
sometimes they cooperate; federalism produces dynamic and uneven
results.16 This Article asks what underlies these crescendos and
diminuendos to push tendencies in one direction or the other. I invite
further investigation as to the conditions that make areas of unknown
sovereignty such as this nuanced discrimination ripe for social move-
ments. While this could be another piece of scholarship to add to the
many about federalism, or a lesser-read article about housing policy,
instead, it contests the academic modelling practice and seeks to em-
power policymakers to explore the potentialities of federalism to
achieve meaningful change.
I. SKETCHING THE PROBLEM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ISSUES
A. Two HOUSING POLICIES
The two sets of housing policies I delineate are distinct in both
their entrenchment and their scale. Both are open for legislators at
the local, state, and national levels to create laws that provide or en-
14. Megan Quattlebaum raises the same queries implicated in this Article regard-
ing this statement. See Megan Quattlebaum, States Lead - Will the Feds Follow?, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/megan-quattlebaum/
states-lead-will-the-feds-b_5780764.html; but see Aaron Chatterji, Don't Look to States
for New Ideas, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/opinion/
dont-look-to-states-for-new-ideas.html?_r=0.
15. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve
the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing the "truism[ ]
that the federal and state governments have largely overlapping jurisdictions"). For
overlapping sovereignty generally, see, Neil MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State,
56 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1993). Cf. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The
Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from in-
cursion by the other.").




able access to fair housing. These areas of undefined sovereignty17
are ripe for study to help policymakers conceptualize how to maximize
the potential of federalism to deliver a coherent and productive out-
come to constituents.
Structural housing policy and antidiscrimination housing stat-
utes are situated in different sections of the United States Code,
though there is no obvious reason that they would need to be treated
separately. Their respective locations in the Code are more likely the
result of different framing and their introductions at different mo-
ments in time as I show below.'8 In fact, the early structural policy
for low-income housing included some antidiscrimination language
prohibiting government authorities from discriminating against fami-
lies on the basis of their receipt of public assistance.'9 That law was
replaced with a statute that lacked the same protection in 1974.20
Since that time, the federal government has continued to support low-
income housing through elaborate funding mechanisms and complex
tri-level schemes implicating federal, state, and local resources.2 1 An-
tidiscrimination measures have remained outside the structural
scheme, however. This Article asks why and how the antidiscrimina-
tion policies that have materialized have ricocheted across levels of
government in contrast to their structural counterparts.
B. FEDERALISM THEORY AND PRACTICE
While I focus on how actors manage their overlapping sovereignty
in the complex low-income housing system, my project also draws
broader conclusions for other areas of overlapping sovereignty. The
analysis undertaken here has relevance for practitioners and scholars
seeking to understand how power is shared, developed, and divided
among and between the federal government and the states and their
political subdivisions by examining the contexts in which traditional
models have been deployed. Federal and subfederal entities have ne-
17. See Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV.
465, 466 (1996) [hereinafter Afterword: Federalism's Options] (discussing the existence
of "overlapping regulatory regimes and judicial decision making").
18. Congress used different powers to enact each scheme. Most notable is that the
original antidiscrimination provision Congress enacted against private actors was part
of a housing bill under its general welfare power. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988)). The
provision was never challenged in court on this basis; I highlight this to point out the
potential for additional discrimination legislation to be developed under that premise.
19. See Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 301(8)(c), 63 Stat. 413, 423
(1949) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
20. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and
42 U.S.C.); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2006).
21. See Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633.
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gotiated their shared power in such other areas as education and envi-
ronmental protection, leading scholars to create descriptive labels and
models for their interaction such as dialogic federalism, cooperative
federalism, or polyphonic federalism. Commentators from inside and
outside the law have relied on these descriptive and explanatory mod-
els along with metaphors like "marble cake federalism" or "picket
fence federalism" to capture the interdependence among governing
bodies.
The low-income housing policy struggles surface at the intersec-
tion of federalism and individual rights-two principal structural and
substantive constitutional values. My focus on antidiscrimination
highlights the way in which individual rights in an area of overlap-
ping sovereignty are parsed by the federalist system. The structure of
the system allows for introduction of and experimentation with norms
and ideas that are debated in public spheres of different sizes and
shapes. This experimentation is one of the promises of federalism. As
a construct, federalism can facilitate exchange and cross-institutional,
cross-jurisdictional learning; as an ideology, it can empower democ-
racy. In the area of public housing policy, it has enabled a range of
legislative responses to discrimination.
Federalism scholarship2 2 has steered clear of this specific debate
and instead typically takes up interaction among judiciaries.23 My
project is centered on the legislative allocation of power, but courts are
also significant players in the narrative. Most of the federalism litera-
ture treats courts as arbiters of the allocation question.2 4 In this way,
22. For simplification, I define federalism as encapsulating the structure and rela-
tionship between federal, state, and local levels of governance. The literature in this
area is vast, although few have noticed the unique dynamics of the housing area.
Awareness regarding source-of-income discrimination is growing, however. See Kinara
Flagg, Mending the Safety Net Through Source of Income Protections: The Nexus Be-
tween Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare Law, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201
(2011); Tamica H. Daniel, Note, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher
Program: Addressing Voucher Discrimination under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98
GEO. L.J. 769 (2010); Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source of Income Discrimina-
tion, and Federal Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1407
(2010); Laura Bacon, Note, Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey: Creating a Meaningful Choice
for Housing Voucher Holders, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1273 (2006); Paula Beck, Fighting
Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's New Frontier, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 155 (1996).
23. See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARv. L.
REV. 4 (2010).
24. See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 795, 826 (1996); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 935 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's
willingness to protect states from preemption); James F. Blumstein, Federalism and
Civil Rights: Complementary and Competing Paradigms, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1251, 1272-
80 (1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's role as arbiter of federalism questions); Er-
nest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2001)
[Vol. 48
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it accords courts a substantial degree of authority. The public housing
discrimination story demonstrates the limits of that analysis. This
Article evaluates the role of courts in negotiating the federal and state
protective measures and concludes that rather than having delineated
appropriate areas of authority, courts have muddied the waters, defy-
ing legislative intent.
Separate from those who focus on the judiciary, some federalism
scholars tend to treat federal, state, and local governments as ingle
institutional actors whereas their interactions take place within bu-
reaucratic, representative, or participatory structures, from the gover-
nor to the state legislature, from professionalized state bureaucracies
to the independently elected attorney general.25 Federalism theory
has not given sufficient attention to these facts. I examine the partici-
pation of a range of local, state, and federal legislative actors, quasi-
governmental bodies, executive authorities, and federal and state ju-
diciaries insofar as each contributes to this narrative.
In what follows, I first sketch the contours of overlapping sover-
eignty and offer a menu of options for approaching such areas where
the contours of authority are not fixed. I then turn to the history of
structural housing policy, its aims, and its reliance on federalism,
before deconstructing the history of the fair housing legislative
agenda. Next, I explore the proliferation of the prohibition on "source-
of-income" discrimination through a transfederalist lens. I conclude
with an analysis of the resulting cartography and its implications.
Lastly, I set out preliminary thoughts that broach some of the norma-
tive issues lurking behind the complex legal and governance relation-
ships central to this Article.
II. MENU FOR ADDRESSING OVERLAPPING SOVEREIGNTY
Federalism scholarship is wrought with descriptive and explana-
tory models examining federalist processes at work, the constitutional
and statutory distributions of powers, and their implications. Here, I
present three menu options for policymakers confronted with a novel
issue, the authority over which is not immediately apparent based on
past practice or the limits of the federal structure, or an issue for
which that authority is called into question. The two sets of housing
policies I study here have both been taken up or could be taken up at
("[T]he Rehnquist Court has been engaged in an attempt to revive the notion of judi-
cially-enforceable limits on national power."); but see Hills, supra note 15, at 32-40
(describing how judicial anti-preemption decisions would encourage and improve con-
gressional discussion on the scope of state powers).




any level, that is, by federal, state, or local policymakers. After outlin-
ing the menu, I argue that the structural policies have evolved accord-
ing to the communication approach, whereas the antidiscrimination
policies have moved along the spectrum between the communication
and default approaches as they have evolved.
A. ASSIGNMENT
Under the assignment approach, one level of government makes
an overt expression of authority over an issue area through a govern-
ance measure or measures, as if to stake a claim, and maintains fairly
exclusive control. As a result, the issue is "assigned" or "categorized."
Today, categorical federalism is no longer the dominant construct it
once was among scholars,2 6 though government actors frequently
stake claims. Below, I turn to the alternative approaches that have
overtaken the assignment approach. It is worth considering, never-
theless, the possibilities for assignment within the context of low-in-
come housing. In the case of discrimination in public housing, for
example, there may be some utility to centralizing antidiscrimination
lawmaking at the federal level to fall in step with the structural hous-
ing legislation; alternatively, localization by way of devolution might
make sense so that each local community could implement antidis-
crimination provisions where necessary and enforce them just as each
community implements structural federal housing policy. As I will
show below, the legislation has developed such that neither area be-
longs exclusively to one level of government.
B. COMMUNICATION
According to the communication approach, federal and subfederal
levels engage in purposeful allocation of authority and enforcement.
This approach incorporates the dialogic model of federalism advocated
by scholars like Catherine Powell and the cooperative models of
26. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Federalism:
Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 675-82 (2006) (arguing that "the
line between the 'local' and the 'national' grew increasingly hypothetical and arbitrary");
Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sover-
eigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50
ARIz. L. REV. 709, 781 (2008) (discussing how categorical federalism can no longer serve
as a descriptive label); see also Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Compact Clause, 88
TEX. L. REV. 741, 804 (2010); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gen-
der, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 622 (2001) (discussing harms of categorical feder-
alism); Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and
Holland, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44 (2008).
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Robert Schapiro and others.2 7 These dialogic and interactive descrip-
tive models of federalism have largely replaced the previously en-
trenched dual or categorical federalism models.28 In brief, dialogic
federalism "links national and subnational governments in a dialogue
about rights by 'creat[ing] areas of overlap in which neither system
can claim total sovereignty."'29 It identifies substantive collaboration
between and among actors of multiple levels of government. For ex-
ample, the federal government might provide a floor upon which state
and local governments could build additional regulation or guidance.
Alternatively, the federal government might promulgate a rule, to be
enforced by subfederal actors. Communication need not be collabora-
tive, however, and may be more aptly referred to as "combative" in
some instances.30 Under this model, issues percolate, borrow, and
have centripetal force.
C. DEFAULT
The default approach represents a natural "falling of the chips."
Where there is no communication, no mechanism for dialogue, or no
political will to generate broad, coordinated legislative attention to an
issue at any level, the default is that which a single level adopts uni-
laterally. Policies creep into the interstices, wherever there is enough
support for them to do so, in the absence of concerted effort. For dis-
crimination in public housing programs, this approach is reflective of
the status quo. In the face of silence since 1998 from the federal gov-
ernment, and no social movement to encourage legislative initiative in
this area, state statutes and local ordinances are the only prohibitions
on discrimination against low income residents.3 1 This piecemeal im-
plementation results in spotty and scattered prohibitions, specific to
each jurisdiction. Note that this example shows default by way of fed-
27. See Hills, supra note 15; Afterword: Federalism's Options, supra note 17. See
also Robert Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IowA L. REV. 243
(2005).
28. See supra notes 15, 17. See infra note 32.
29. Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorpo-
ration of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 249 (2001)
(quoting Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977)).
30. Gerken writes:
[D]iJalogue is too anodyne a term to attach to this phenomenon, as it suggests
that states are simply engaging the federal government in a polite conversa-
tion, ready to offer their docile obedience if the center rejects their claims. Re-
bellious state policymaking is distinct from the dominant modalities of federal-
state dialogue - speaking and lobbying. What many federalism scholars call
'dialogue,' in short, is often a fight.
Gerken, supra note 23, at 67.




eral silence and state action, but the opposite could also be true and
qualify as "default."
32
These three approaches are not to be exclusive or limited; rather,
they comprise a spectrum of options along which federal and sub-
federal activity takes place, according to scholars. Further, the spec-
trum is not unidimensional. For example, somewhere between the
default and communication models one might situate a coordinated
effort among actors at a single level, such as subfederal players engag-
ing in horizontal federalism.
Applied here, I seek to locate antidiscrimination policymaking
along the multidimensional spectrum and understand in what con-
texts local governance remains local as opposed to others in which it
motivates the development of a national norm. As a result of the bi-
furcation in the law and the disappearance of federal protection, an
array of transfederal itigation in the courts with sundry outcomes has
implicated state and local housing antidiscrimination law alongside
claims arising under the federal housing program with additional im-
plications for the legislative approach adopted.
33
III. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL HOUSING PROGRAM
In this Part, I present an overview of the history and evolution of
the low-income housing program in the United States. Lawmaking in
this area has developed through a high degree of communication and
collaboration among policymakers at multiple levels of government.
A. CREATING A "NATIONAL" PROGRAM
The idea of public housing evolved over years of experimentation
by local communities.3 4 The federal government first examined hous-
ing conditions in 1892, with a focus on urban slum areas;35 it would be
another forty years before Congress passed the first housing legisla-
tion designed to improve the plight of those suffering the effects of the
32. Though I do not take it up here, a potential problem that arises in areas of
overlapping sovereignty, and would most appropriately fall in the default approach, is a
collective action challenge whereby each level defers to others to address the issue.
33. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Parts III-V.
34. As early as 1867, New York City passed the first tenement housing law, see,
1867 N.Y. Laws 2265, in an effort to check the insanitation and overcrowding in pri-
vately owned housing.
35. HUD Historical Background, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv. (May 18,
2007), http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/about/admguide/history.cfm; see also Harold A.




Great Depression. The Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932,36 designed to combat widespread unemployment and financial
collapse, created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ("RFC").
The RFC assisted low-income families by making loans to private cor-
porations that provided housing to those families.37 Two years later,
without having seen much improvement for individual homebuyers,
the government ook additional action. As the Depression ended, Con-
gress passed the United States Housing Act of 193438 to stimulate the
release of private credit for home repairs and construction. Both of
these acts focused largely on home finance and mortgage support, cre-
ating institutions to oversee the initiatives and supervise their imple-
mentation. However, this institutional infrastructure merely put
programs in motion - large schemes designed, in these cases, to pro-
vide the administrative infrastructure for the housing industry.
These institutions did little for those most in need: low-income fami-
lies struggling to get back on their feet in the wake of the
Depression.
39
The United States Housing Act of 193740 filled this void by estab-
lishing the nation's first public housing program.4 1 It intended to
"promote the general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and
credit ... to assist the several states and their political subdivisions
... to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary housing conditions ... for
families of low income."4 2 To administer this policy it created a Na-
tional Housing Authority. The role of the federal government, how-
ever, was limited to providing financial assistance for local projects.
43
The Act was blatant about empowering a federalist structure; its fun-
36. Pub. L. No. 72-301, 47 Stat. 709 (1932).
37. See Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-301, 47
Stat. 709 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1148 (1949)).
38. Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1974)).
39. See DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH,
1820-2000, 121-25 (Vintage Books 2003).
40. Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1974)).
41. See generally TIMOTHY L. McDONNELL, THE WAGNER HOUSING ACT: A CASE
STUDY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1957) (detailing the political and legislative history
of the Housing Act of 1937).
42. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 2, 88
Stat. 633, 635 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1974)).
43. Arguing against the Act were those who felt housing assistance should be fo-
cused on the suffering middle class; still stronger opponents objected to the subsidy-
based design, equating it with socialism. See Peter Dreier, Federal Housing Subsidies:
Who Benefits and Why?, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL
AGENDA 105, 113 (Rachel G. Bratt, Michael E. Stone & Chester Hartman eds., 2006).
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damental purpose was to enable states and municipalities to improve
conditions in their own jurisdictions.
44
In fact, by 1937, twenty-nine states had already passed laws per-
mitting communities to form local housing authorities with the powers
needed to meet the requirements for federal assistance; forty-six such
authorities had been established pursuant to the state legislation, but
only a few had undertaken projects prior to 1937.4 5 Cities have also
played a major role in national policymaking in this area since the
Progressive Era when many reformers focused their attention on city
improvement. During this period of social improvement-before the
rise of the welfare state and the federal apparatus that governed it-
cities became the main players in progressive change as they obtained
federal funds.
46
The 1937 Act shaped the foundation of housing programs in the
United States. It guided the direction of programs to come, including
the urban renewal program, the Section 8 housing assistance pro-
gram, and others that aimed to improve housing conditions for low
and moderate income families. Notably, its emphasis on the devolu-
tion of responsibility to the states and their political subdivisions for
the amelioration of unsafe housing conditions set into motion a
scheme that would govern housing programs over the next seventy
years, to the present day. This early federal legislation stressed finan-
cial aid to the states. Since its inception, however, national housing
policy has faced tensions about just how much responsibility states
and municipalities may exercise in their management of federal
grants.
47
A dozen years later, the federal government changed the scope of
its role in overseeing housing in America.48 The inadequacies of the
1937 program were made apparent by an increased reliance on state
and local programs.4 9 Thus, in a departure from the emphasis placed
44. In fact, the authority of local governments over these public housing agencies
varies from state to state, but more often than not, it is a very tenuous link. The agen-
cies are instrumentalities of the federal government, though independent corporations.
45. See NATHANIEL S. KEITH, POLITICS AND THE HOUSING CRISIS SINCE 1930, 29
(1973).
46. Richard Schragger, The Progressive City, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDER-
ALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL
LIMAN PUBLIC INTEREST PROGRAM COLLOQUIUM 44 (Kathleen Claussen, et al. eds., 2009),
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/liman-whyTheLocalMatters.pdf.
47. See Otto J. Hetzel, Asserted Federal Devolution of Public Housing Policy and
Administration: Myth or Reality, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 415, 417 (2000).
48. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
49. See Housing Act of 1949 § 101(b).
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on the states in the language of the 1937 Act, the 1949 Act 50 was in-
tended "[t]o establish a national housing objective."5 1 It set forward a
declaration of the new centralized housing policy: "The Congress
hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the Nation
and the health and living standards of its people require housing pro-
duction and related community development sufficient to remedy the
serious housing shortage .... -52
By realizing "the goal of a decent home and a suitable living envi-
ronment for every American family,"53 the Act purported to contribute
"to the advancement of the growth, wealth, and security of the Na-
tion."54 The Act created a policy "to provide federal aid to assist ...
low-rent public housing projects initiated by local agencies"5 5 and en-
couraged local housing authorities to undertake programs that would
assist in the development of integrated and affordable housing for low-
income people.5 6 The use of the term "local agency" is slightly mis-
leading insofar as these local authorities were not governmental bod-
ies either under the aegis of local or federal governments.5 7 Federal
and state legislation empowered their creation, while local govern-
ment directed their work. Still, the overall effect of the Act was a
slight shift from a program premised on federal money filtered
through the state with a large degree of autonomy on the part of the
state, to one in which federal money was funneled directly to the local
level with a higher degree of local ownership. Both of these structures
reflect a high degree of cooperation and communication among the
levels.
50. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
51. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
52. Id. § 2.
53. Id.
54. Id. Note, in particular, the Act's invocation of Congress's Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 1 authority to provide for the general welfare: "The Congress hereby declares
that the general welfare and security of the Nation ... require housing production and
related community development . . . ."; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
55. Pub. L. No. 81-171, pmbl., § 101, 63 Stat. 413, 413-14.
56. See id. § 2.
57. Rather, public housing authorities are entities incorporated under state law.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-40 (1955).
In each municipality of the state there is created a public body corporate and
politic to be known as the 'housing authority' of the municipality; provided such
authority shall not transact any business or exercise its powers hereunder un-
til the governing body of the municipality by resolution declares that there is
need for a housing authority in the municipality ....
Id. Other housing authorities refer to themselves as "quasi-governmental." See, e.g.,
GREENSBORO Hous. AUTH., http://www.gha-nc.org (last visited Feb. 28, 2015); Hous.
AUTH. OF THE CITY OF GREENVILLE, http://www.ghanc.net/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2015);




Thus, while the precise contours of the devolved components of
the federal programs have fluctuated, the policy's cooperative federal-
to-subfederal structure has remained intact. The federal government
has empowered local agencies to administer the program with little
friction. Title III of the 1949 Act focused exclusively on low-rent pub-
lic housing, amending the 1937 Housing Act.58 While the structure
for aid to the poor was created by this Act, it would be another twenty
years before protections against discrimination could be put into place
for the recipients of this aid, as part of the Section 8 voucher
program.59
B. SECTION 8
Congress first established the Section 8 housing program through
the Housing and Community Development Act of 197460 "[flor the
purpose of aiding lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to
live and of promoting economically mixed housing .... ,,61 The name
"Section 8" comes from the section of the original 1937 Act under
which low-income housing support is authorized.62 The Section 8 sys-
tem originally had two main parts: the certificate program and the
voucher program.
63
The certificate program, authorized by Congress and adminis-
tered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD"), provided rental assistance payments to owners of residential
rental properties on behalf of low-income tenants.64 Under the pro-
gram, a family applied for participation directly to the local public
housing authority ("PHA") 65 which would then determine that fam-
ily's eligibility and, if warranted, issue the family a Certificate of Fam-
ily Participation. It was then the family's responsibility to seek an
appropriate dwelling-a privately owned apartment that they could
rent at or below a locally established fair market rent-that met the
criteria of the PHA. When a suitable unit was found and after the
58. Pub. L. No. 81-171, §§ 301-07, 63 Stat. 413, 422-31.
59. See, e.g., Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, CONN. DEP'T OF Hous.,
http://www.ct.gov/doh/cwp/view.asp?a=4513&q=530586 (describing Section 8 housing
choice vouchers as "the government's major program for assisting very-low-income fami-
lies to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market").
60. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
61. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1437 (2006)).
62. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 8, 50 Stat. 888, 891
(1937) (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1974)).
63. Pub. L. No. 75-412, § 8, 50 Stat. 888, 891 (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1974)).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1 (2012).
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PHA had approved the family's selected unit, the family would sign a
lease with the landlord. At the same time, the PHA would sign a con-
tract with the property owner committing to subsidize the tenant fam-
ily's rent. The PHA paid the contract rent, minus the tenant family's
rent payment (thirty percent of the household income).66 In return,
landlords had to keep Section 8 rental units in compliance with HUD's
housing quality standards.6 7 Certificate holders had a limited period
to locate a qualifying apartment, after which time the certificate
would revert back to the local housing agency.
68
Similar to the certificate program, the Section 8 voucher program
was established in 1983,69 in part to allow tenants greater choice in
locating apartments.70 The two programs were consolidated in 1998
and today operate under a single voucher system. A voucher may ei-
ther be "project-based"-where its use is limited to a specific apart-
ment unit-or "tenant-based"-where the tenant is free to choose a
unit in the private sector.7 1 Under the tenant-based voucher provi-
sions, HUD contracts with PHAs to run the program. Applicants ap-
ply to the PHA for vouchers72 and then are responsible for finding
housing. After an apartment is found and inspected, the PHA con-
tracts with the owner to provide assistance payments. Landlords col-
lect the remainder of the rent from the Section 8 tenant, which
normally comes to thirty percent of their income.73 The flexibility pro-
vided to tenants under this system allows them to live where they
choose, paying more than thirty percent of their income toward an
above-market-price rent, rather than in units selected by Section 8.74
Alternatively, they may find a unit for less than the fair market rent
and reserve their savings.
Several reforms and attempted reforms have been made to the
Section 8 scheme since its creation. One of the most significant re-
forms was the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability
66. See HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF THE POOR: THE
AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO POOR PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 225 (1997).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2015).
68. Salute v. Stratford Greens (Salute I), 918 F. Supp. 660, 662 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
69. Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat.
1183 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2006)); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.101-
.102 (1995).
70. See Paula Beck, Fighting Section 8 Discrimination: The Fair Housing Act's
New Frontier, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 157 (1996).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437e (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 882.701-.716 (1998). This C.F.R. has
also been "reserved."
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2006); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 882, 887, 982, 983 (2008);
HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 66, at 255.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(2)(A) (2006).
74. See HERSHKOFF & LOFFREDO, supra note 66, at 225-26.
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Act of 199775 ("MAHRAA"). The purpose of MAHRAA was to protect
tenants affected by the termination of expiring project-based Section 8
contracts and to prevent their displacement7 6 by providing those te-
nants with vouchers. In addition to consolidating the certificate and
voucher programs, MAHRAA redeveloped the system so that vouchers
attach to a particular individual rather than to the rental property,
making the vouchers more portable, but also putting a greater onus on
the prospective tenant to find appropriate housing independently.7 7
The most recent major attempted reform was the Section 8
Voucher Reform Act of 200778 ("SEVRA"). Under bipartisan and di-
verse geographic sponsorship,79 SEVRA received widespread support
in the House of Representatives and passed out of the House on July
12, 2007.80 The bill would have made procedural changes to the man-
ner in which housing was approved by local housing authorities as
well as some income calculation adjustments.8 It also purported to
change the criteria for eligibility in the program8 2 and to establish a
Housing Innovation Program to provide PHAs and HUD with addi-
tional "flexibility to design and evaluate innovative approaches to pro-
viding housing assistance."83 On July 16, 2007, the bill was referred
to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
where it stalled for the remainder of the session.
8 4
75. Pub. L. No. 105-65, 111 Stat. 1384 (1997) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f (2006)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a).
77. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6)-(7).
78. H.R. 1851, 110th Cong. (2007). More recently, smaller inroads have been
made. Under the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115, 215 (2009), for example, owners of certain units are not permitted to
discriminate against voucher holders.
79. The bill was sponsored by: Maxine Waters (CA); Barney Frank (MA); Christo-
pher Shays (CT); Judy Biggert (IL); Donald Payne (NJ), William Delahunt (MA), and
Danny Davis (IL).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 110-216 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. 18888 (2007). The bill
passed by a margin of 333 in favor and 83 opposed.
81. H.R. 1851 § 1-3.
82. Id. § 5.
83. Id. § 16.
84. 153 CONG. REC. 19016 (2007). In the absence of comprehensive coverage, the
federal government has used pieces of its structural programs to achieve some degree of
protection for voucher holders. Voucher non-discrimination provisions can be found
within smaller HUD-related programmatic statutes such as within the HOME Program
legislation, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, and with respect to HUD-
administered mortgages. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(b)(iv) (2012); 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-
5(c)(1)(xi) (2000) (LIHTC); 42 U.S.C. § 12745(a)(1)(D) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 92.252(d)
(2002); HUD PIH Notice 2001-2(HA) (Jan. 18, 2001) (HOME program); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f, note (1998); 24 C.F.R. § 401.556 (2015) (Mark to Market); 12 U.S.C. § 1701z




Today, the Section 8 program supports more than 1.4 million
households,8 5 and a bill introduced, but not passed, in 2009 would
have authorized the allocation of 150,000 more vouchers to "help meet
the housing needs of low-income families."8 6 Nevertheless, the provi-
sion of vouchers is not itself a solution. Some landlords adamantly
refuse to participate in the program on the basis of the intrusion of the
PHA in carrying out inspections; some may fear that Section 8 tenants
will not be responsible tenants; some intend to charge rent above the
fair market rent; and some may be disinclined to abide by HUD's more
stringent eviction provisions (as compared to some state laws). On the
other hand, some landlords may see the Section 8 program as benefi-
cial to their business as a result of the pool of potential renters (the
waiting lists for Section 8 tenants are typically lengthy), or because
they value the prompt and regular payments from the PHA for its
share of the rent.
Although the Section 8 program, like its predecessors, reflects a
cooperative approach among the levels of government in the United
States to the provision of low-income housing, fair housing initiatives
have been less cooperative. Despite the apparent parallelism in these
two issues, their evolutions in our federal system have followed diver-
gent paths.
IV. ENDING DISCRIMINATION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
This Part and the one that follows it will demonstrate how the
cooperative federalism made manifest in the structure of the national
housing program outlined above has not been replicated in the an-
tidiscrimination context; rather, antidiscrimination initiatives have
been left by default to any local or state community that will take up
the cause.
A. FAIR HOUSING AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN CONGRESS
Beginning in the 1960s, fair housing laws developed indepen-
dently from the system-creating laws that provide and regulate public
housing assistance. Prior to that time, one subsection of a structural
programmatic statute afforded protection from discrimination by the
PHA. The Housing Act of 194987 included a single provision that pro-
85. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM
GUIDEBOOK (2001), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HLD?src=/program offi
ces/publicindian housing/programs/hcv/forms/guidebook; Section 8 Rental Certificate
Program, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., available at http://portal.hud.gov/hud
portal/HUD?src=/programdescriptioncert8.
86. H.R. 168, 111th Cong. (2009).
87. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
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hibited discrimination by public authorities in their distribution of
housing benefits to low-income applicants on the basis of their in-
come.8s The Act provided that "in the selection of tenants (i) the pub-
lic housing agency shall not discriminate against families, otherwise
eligible for admission to such housing, because their incomes are de-
rived in whole or in part from public assistance ... ."89 The prolifera-
tion of separate statutes with the label of "fair housing" accompanied
the civil rights movement nearly twenty years later.90
Attempts to do more at the time of the 1949 Act's passage-the
start of a time of great importance for public policy and civil rights in
the United States-failed. In the final days before the vote on the Act,
Senators John Bricker (R-Ohio) and Henry Cain (R-Washington) co-
sponsored an amendment forbidding racial and other forms of discrim-
ination in housing;91 however, the Cain-Bricker Amendment was not
a friendly one-neither in terms of the legislative meaning of the word
nor in the colloquial sense with reference to fair housing advocates.
For almost three years, the "omnibus housing act" had undergone de-
bate in Congress. Just as it appeared close to passage, Bricker and
Cain brought an amendment to the floor in an effort to defeat it.9
2
Their goal was to eliminate all regulations on affordable housing be-
cause, they believed, "the market [could] produce a sufficient supply of
affordable housing [units].193 Cain and Bricker intended their amend-
ment to divide proponents of the bill-splitting urban liberals and
southern segregationists-so as to thwart its passage.94
The Cain-Bricker Amendment would have declared the policy of
the Congress to support "equality of treatment of all people . . . in
housing of Government credit" and that "all housing, owned and oper-
ated by the United States, or aided or subsidized in any manner, di-
rectly or indirectly shall be operated without such discrimination."95
The Amendment, which would eventually be rejected by the Senate
Banking and Commerce Committee by a vote of 10-2,96 would have
required property owners in violation to pay up to $10,000 or to be
88. Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 301, 63 Stat. 413, 422 (1949) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
89. Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 301, 63 Stat. 413, 423.
90. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81, 81 (1968)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006)).
91. See A. SCOTT HENDERSON, HOUSING AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL: THE LIFE AND
THOUGHT OF CHARLES ABRAMS 153-54 (2000).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153.
94. Id. at 154.
95. In the Nation's Capital, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD, Apr. 19, 1949, at 6 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
96. It was believed that Senator Bricker introduced the amendment in an effort to
defeat the entirety of the national housing legislation. See id.
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imprisoned for up to one year, or both. In an editorial comment in the
Atlanta Daily World around that time, the spirit of the amendment
was defended as necessary for the United States to "maintain its place
of moral merit leadership" and for "squar[ing] its practices with its
preachments."9 7 The authors of the comment noted that since Con-
gress had passed no legislative civil rights package since 1875, this
sort of integration into a bill addressing housing would be "a necessary
implementation" of a movement already underway through the
United States Supreme Court to eliminate segregation in housing.
98
The Amendment was defeated on April 21, 1949, while the housing
legislation survived.99
Ironically, the Cain-Bricker incident began a noticeable trend of
integrating rights-promoting and protective measures into the organic
statutes of structural federal programs. In the years that followed,
legislators opposed to public housing programs developed and intro-
duced similar amendments to housing bills, "illustrating how civil
rights riders could become tools of those who wished to defeat, not en-
act legislation."'0 0 At the same time, some of the nation's major influ-
ential figures believed that discrimination would be fought through
building more low-income housing, not through antidiscrimination
laws themselves.101
B. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT, ITS PROGENY, AND THE FIRST
RETRACTION
As the civil rights movement grew in force, pushing Congress to
action in the early 1960s, draft legislation circulated that expressed
the social concern of not only providing decent housing to all, but also
ensuring that such housing was made available and accessible to all.
In that spirit, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order
11063 on Equal Opportunity in Housing10 2 on November 20, 1962.103
The Order, urged by the federal Civil Rights Commission and its affili-
ated advocates ,104 represented the first major effort by a branch of the
federal government to address civil rights in housing. The text of the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See 95 CONG. REC. 4831 (1949); 95 CONG. REC. D221 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1949).
100. HENDERSON, supra note 91, at 154.
101. Id. at 155.
102. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 24 C.F.R. § 107.10 (1962).
103. President Kennedy issued this Order just two days before he was assassinated.
104. See Weaver Calls for Discrimination Ban in Housing, DAILY CAPITAL NEWS (Jef-
ferson City, Mo.), Apr. 13, 1962, at 3.
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Order is almost identical to the language used by Congress in the Fair
Housing Act' 0 5 six years later.
The Fair Housing Act was the first Congressional effort to combat
discrimination in the private housing context; it took shape in Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.106 The law made it "unlawful for
any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in resi-
dential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any
person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or con-
ditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin."10 7 This federal protec-
tion was added to protections already in force by way of state and local
legislation.l0 8 In the passage of the federal law, legislators made ref-
erence to the state and local laws in force, again engaging with other
levels of government, even if just by reference.10 9 The conversations
on the floor of the House and Senate acknowledged the proliferation of
state support for protection against discrimination on the basis of race
and other factors.110 The passage of the federal act would codify the
growth of the burgeoning national norm which had been taken up by
the states.
By passing the Fair Housing Act ("the Act"), Congress took a ma-
jor step toward protecting certain classes of individuals from discrimi-
nation in the housing market across the country. In the first few
years after it entered into force, hundreds of claims were adjudi-
cated."' Nevertheless, the Act was quickly criticized as being insuffi-
cient in terms of the protection it provided, particularly with respect
to its limited enforcement mechanism and the unavailability of relief
105. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1996)).
106. It was preceded by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964)), which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national origin" in programs and activities
receiving federal aid.
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3605 (2006).
108. Michael H. Schill, Implementing the Federal Fair Housing Act: The Adjudica-
tion of Complaints, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT, HoUsING, AND
FAIRNESS 143, 144 (John Goering ed., 2007) ("[S]everal states and localities had already
adopted laws forbidding discrimination in privately owned housing. . . ."). Today, 39
states have fair housing acts. See State and Local Fair Housing Enforcement Laws, THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, http://www.civilrights.org/fairhousing/laws/state-laws.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2015).
109. See 114 CONG. REC. S2530-32 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1968) (statement of Sen. Tyd-
ings) (summarizing fair housing legislation in 23 states).
110. See id.
111. Ware, supra note 9, at 79. This study does not take up an examination regard-
ing how much the Act was relied upon as compared to individual state provisions and




for plaintiff-tenants.112 Despite some level of success in the courts,
housing discrimination continued to be widespread'13 over the next
twenty years, prompting legislators to add force to the "toothless ti-
ger"1 4 and eventually leading them to enact the 1988 Amendments.
In the interim, however, Congress enacted additional fair housing
measures in the spirit of the original Act. For example, the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974115 prohibited discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion in pro-
grams and activities receiving financial assistance from HUD's
Community Development and Block Grant ("CDBG") Program.116
The 1974 Act is of particular importance here because it also had
the effect of removing the antidiscrimination clause enacted in the
Housing Act of 1949117 that prohibited discrimination by local housing
agencies with respect to source-of-income. This provision had previ-
ously protected low-income benefits recipients in their access to public
housing.1 18 In the midst of the restructuring and implementation of
the CDBG Program, the 1949 language simply disappeared from the
Code, without discussion, in what appears to be inadvertent error.
Throughout the early 1980s, legislators discussed and defeated
several drafts of amendments to the Fair Housing Act, most of which
were rejected as a result of controversy surrounding enhanced en-
forcement mechanisms. Finally, the amendments passed in 1988 im-
proved enforcement and provided protection against discrimination to
two new classes: the handicapped and families with children.1 19
112. Id.
113. Schill, supra note 108, at 145.
114. 134 CONG. REC. S10455 (1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
115. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
116. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat.
633 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.).
117. Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
118. See Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
119. Ware, supra note 9, at 84.
Although the inclusion of handicapped persons seemed desirable, it soon be-
came clear that to some legislators, its level of desirability depended upon the
definition of 'handicapped.' A compromise was eventually reached, which
would allow 'handicapped' to be defined to include, for example, individuals
infected with the HIV (or AIDS) virus, but not individuals whose current sub-
stance abuse/addiction posed a threat to others. Similarly, the inclusion of
families with children disturbed a few legislators who anticipated a dilution of
effective enforcement of fair housing claims due to the sizable increase in the
number of claims this group would likely generate.
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Future acts and executive orders would build on this framework,
such as President Bill Clinton's Executive Order 12892 which
amended President Kennedy's mandate by extending the protected
classes to those defined by "race, color, religion (creed), sex, disability,
familial status or national origin."120 None of these acts or orders
made mention of discrimination on the basis of an individual's source
of income.
C. FIGHTING PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SECTION 8
ASSISTANCE
1. Legislation
In the lead-up to the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,121
the House and Senate considered several drafts of various types of
housing legislation. Among these was a 1985 draft considered by the
House of Representatives that included a prohibition on discrimina-
tion on the basis of holding a Section 8 voucher.122 The final Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 123 as passed by the
Congress later that session did not contain the suggested language.
By 1987, however, the proponents of the antidiscrimination provision
prevailed.124 The House passed the bill to the Senate and eventually,
after meeting success in both houses, the legislation was given to a
Conference Committee for final revisions. In its Report on the bill, the
Committee noted:
The House amendment contained a provision that was not
contained in the Senate bill to prohibit private owners who
have entered into a Section 8 contract for housing assistance
payments for tenants in their multifamily housing projects,
from refusing to lease available dwelling units at the fair
market rent (FMR) to a holder of a Section 8 certificate or
voucher. The conference report contains the House provision
125
The House version that prevailed was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t).
Though the Committee did not characterize the provision as an an-
120. Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994) (quotation marks
omitted).
121. Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
122. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82 (1985) (the language was nearly identical to the language that was
finally passed in 1988).
123. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (1985).
124. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
105 Stat. 1815 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 42
U.S.C.).
125. H.R. REP. No. 100-426, at 178-79 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3458, 3475-76 (1987).
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tidiscrimination measure, in effect (and in its final title), the section
served that purpose. The record tracing the history of the provision
and the justification for its implementation is sparse. No reference
was made in the Congressional Record to state or local antidiscrimina-
tion laws already in place, as there had been with the Fair Housing
Act 1 26 twenty years earlier. As shown below, only a small handful of
states and municipalities had passed antidiscrimination provisions for
low-income tenants.1 27 The federal legislature enacted this protection
despite the absence of a social movement underway at the state or
local level.
In supporting this addition to the bill, Congress made clear not
only its intent to serve tenants and provide them with "greater access
to decent and affordable housing" but also that the provision grant
tenants and their advocates "a cause of action to enforce the statute in
federal court."1 28 The extensive historical record further clarified
Congress's objective with respect to tenants' rights vis-h-vis private
landlords:
Because owners often unreasonably refuse to rent units to ap-
plicants who hold these portable subsidies, this bill contains
several provisions to changes [sic] the practices of owners in-
volved in other federal housing programs. Section 147 of the
bill creates an enforceable right for applicants that would pro-
hibit owners that receive Section 8 subsidies for any other
units in the project from refusing to rent a unit to a certificate
or voucher holder ... because the applicant has a Section 8
certificate or voucher housing subsidy.
12 9
The language of the relevant section of the bill cannot mistake this
intent. Titled "Nondiscrimination against certificate holders and
voucher holders," the bill prohibits any owner who receives housing
assistance payments through a public housing authority from refusing
to enter into a housing assistance payments contract with a Section 8
voucher where "a proximate cause of [the refusal] is the status of such
prospective tenant as a holder of such voucher."1 30 This was a great
126. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
127. See infra Parts VI & VII.
128. H.R. REP. No. 100-122(I), at 53 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317,
3369 (1987).
129. H.R. REP. No. 100-122(I), at 32 (emphasis added). In spite of this added lan-
guage, some courts have refused to recognize such a right. See infra Subsection IV.C.2.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (1994) (repealed 1998). Section A covered all other
certificate programs in the same manner, prohibiting any property owner from not leas-
ing any available dwelling to a Section 8 voucher holder, "a proximate cause of which is
the status of such prospective tenant as holder of such a certificate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(t)(1)(A) (1994) (repealed 1998).
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victory for Section 8 recipients, affording them significant protection
and a means by which to take action against delinquent landlords.
It would not last long. By 1994, there was already significant
pressure to remove what came to be known as the "take one, take all"
clause from the wording of the statute. Before considering how and
why the once highly regarded protection deteriorated, I examine
whether it was relied upon to combat discrimination in the Section 8
program and if so, how.
13 '
2. Litigation
The first action raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) came two-and-a-
half years after Congress added it to the Low-Income Housing Pro-
gram guidelines. In 1990, Judge Mary Johnson Lowe of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
a landlord who had previously entered into contracts for housing as-
sistance payments on behalf of some of its Section 8 tenants could not
refuse to rent an apartment to a Section 8 voucher holder applicant
"as a result of that applicant's status as a Section 8 voucher
holder."1 3 2 Such a refusal constituted a "clear[] violat[ion under] the
anti-discrimination provision."133 This decision signaled a positive
start for the courts' interpretation and application of the law, though
it was short-lived.
Fewer than half a dozen claims were litigated in the federal
courts during the ten years the federal government maintained this
protection for voucher holders.1 34 Plaintiff-tenants were successful in
litigating against their landlords in two of these: Glover v. Crestwood
Lake,1 35 quoted above, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, and Knapp v. Smijanic,'36 discussed
below. In another Southern District of New York case, Riddick v.
Summit House,13 7 the district judge did not reach the plaintiffs
131. Due to limitations on research materials, I focus on litigation in state and fed-
eral courts for this analysis, though there is also evidence of litigation in local commis-
sions on this matter (often appealed to the state court system) and other efforts outside
the judiciary, such as publicity campaigns to promote awareness and enforcement by
nongovernmental agencies.
132. Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301, 309
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
133. Glover, 746 F. Supp. at 309.
134. It is difficult to surmise or speculate as to whether the law was effective in
deterring discrimination among landlords outside of the reported litigation; no data is
available with respect to numbers of tenants who gained access who would not other-
wise have had housing as a result of the law.
135. 746 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
136. 847 F. Supp. 1428, 1437 (W.D. Wis. 1994), affd sub nom. Knapp v. Eagle Prop.
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272 (7th Cir. 1995).
137. 835 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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§ 1437f(t) claim, but rather directed the parties to seek resolution on
other grounds.138 In the first of the two losing cases, Peyton v. Reyn-
olds Associates,139 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the plaintiff-tenants had failed to establish causa-
tion-namely, that their status as voucher holders was the cause of
the landlord's refusal to enter into leases.140 The panel distinguished
the plaintiffs' situation from that in Glover on the basis of the Reyn-
olds Associates' denial that the plaintiffs' voucher status had any role
in its decision to not rent to them, whereas in Glover, the landlord-
corporation conceded that the voucher holders' status was the cause of
its denying them tenancy.
141
The most thorough depiction of the protection intended by the fed-
eral law, yet rejected by the courts, comes from neither of the two af-
firmative decisions, but instead from an ardent dissent by Judge
Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in a case where, as in the other cases cited above, the prospec-
tive tenants brought a claim against the landlords under § 1437f(t)
alleging discrimination on the basis of their status as voucher holders.
In his dissent in Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments,
14 2
Judge Calabresi described the majority's position (ruling in favor of
the landlord defendants) as a "judicially created exception that, [the
court] concedes, departs from the statute's plain meaning and that...
finds no support in the [law's] legislative history."143 He noted that
the majority "admit[ted] that the clear purpose of § 1437f(t)... was to
prevent landlords" from discriminating against Section 8 applicants,
and further criticized the holding:
In fact, the actual language of the House Report is considera-
bly stronger and states that Congress enacted this provision
'to create[] an enforceable right for applicants that would
prohibit owners that receive Section 8 subsidies for any other
units in the project from refusing to rent a unit to a certificate
... holder .. . because the applicant has a Section 8 certifi-
cate ....... It is therefore difficult to see how the legislative
history supports the district court's conclusion-embraced by
the majority-that '[t]he case before [it] d[id] not implicate
th[e] concern [of the House Report].
'144
138. Riddick v. Summit House, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 137, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The
judge found the dispute to be between the public housing authority and the landlord,
not the prospective tenant.
139. 955 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1992).
140. Peyton v. Reynolds Assocs., 955 F.2d 247, 252 (4th Cir. 1992).
141. Peyton, 955 F.2d at 253-54.
142. 136 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 1998).
143. Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments (Salute III), 136 F.3d 293, 303
(2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
144. Salute III, 136 F.3d at 305 n.8 (internal citations omitted).
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The district court decision that Judge Calabresi cites145 was a critical
turning point in the § 1437f(t) litigation and provides insight into the
groundwork for what would eventually signal the provision's demise.
In his first decision, rendered in May 1995, District Judge John
Gleeson granted the plaintiff-tenants' motion for preliminary injunc-
tive relief and ordered the property owners to rent an apartment to
the prospective tenants.146 Nine months later, however, he reversed
his original holding and found in favor of the property-owning
corporation.
147
Judge Gleeson's second decision, later affirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit, in which he overturned his own earlier holding that the defen-
dant landlord had violated the antidiscrimination provision was
premised on several factors. First, Judge Gleeson found that a
"straightforward application"14s of the law "would produce an odd and
unfortunate result"'4 9-unfortunate enough to grant him license to go
outside the four corners of the statute in forming his decision. Recog-
nizing that "once a landlord chooses to participate by accepting a Sec-
tion 8 tenant, it cannot turn away subsequent Section 8 certificate
holders based on their status as Section 8 participants," the judge nev-
ertheless found "force" in the property owner's argument that a deci-
sion in favor of the tenants would amount to a "forced marriage with
the government."150 Second, Judge Gleeson relied heavily on the "nu-
merous legislative efforts" underway in Congress at the time to repeal
§ 1437f~t) (referred to as the "take one, take all" provision).15 1 The
principal justifications for the repeal were to "minimize the burdens of
Section 8 participation" and thereby make the program "more attrac-
tive to landlords."
152
145. Salute 11, 918 F. Supp. 660, 664-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
146. Salute v. Stratford Greens (Salute 1), 888 F. Supp. 17, 21 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
147. Salute 11, 918 F. Supp. at 668. This decision was affirmed by the Second Cir-
cuit in Salute III, 136 F.3d at 302.
148. Salute 11, 918 F. Supp. at 663.
149. Id. at 664.
150. Id. at 663, 665.
151. Judge Gleeson acknowledged these developments in detail:
Several bills in the current Congress seek to repeal the "take one, take all"
provision. H.R. 2099, which was introduced on July 21, 1995, was passed by
both the House and the Senate, but was never signed into law. H.R. 2406 was
introduced in the House on September 27, 1995 and reported in the House on
February 1, 1996, but has not been voted on.
Id. at 665 n.3. Another version introduced in the House, H.R. 3019, was introduced less
than three weeks before Salute II came down; it passed in the House in just two days
and was received in the Senate ten days before Judge Gleeson's decision. H.R. Res.
3019, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted). S. 1594 was introduced in the Senate on March 6,
1996 as well, but remained inactive at the time of the Salute II decision. S. 1594, 104th
Cong. (1996).
152. Salute II, 918 F. Supp. at 665.
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V. LOST IN TRANSITION: THE DISAPPEARANCE OF
FEDERAL PROTECTION
Roughly one year before Judge Gleeson's second decision in Salute
v. Stratford Greens,153 in January 1995, ten years after the introduc-
tion of the protective measure, the House Appropriations Committee
entertained testimony from John Weicher of the Hudson Institute re-
garding the difficulties 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) posed on landlords and the
perverse incentives it created.'54 Later that spring, a second set of
hearings led to the suggestion to remove the antidiscrimination provi-
sion altogether. The suggestion came not from industry, but from gov-
ernment-Henry Cisneros, then President Clinton's Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development.15 5 At the time, it was the proposal
of the Clinton Administration to remove the antidiscrimination provi-
sion on the grounds that the provision disincentivized landlords from
participating in the Section 8 program.156 The Administration con-
tended, and Congress agreed, that bringing more landlords into the
program was a priority, though there was no analysis presented to
Congress that demonstrated how bringing more participants in (while
allowing those new and old landlords to discriminate) would lead to an
effective realization of the program's goals.157 Policymakers focused
on encouraging greater landlord participation rather than on other
barriers facing current recipients working within the landlord system.
The removal was formally advanced for the first time in a bill slated to
become the Public Housing Reform and Empowerment Act of 1995,158
153. 918 F. Supp. 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
154. Reinvention of HUD and Redirection of Hous. Policy: Before the Subcomm. On
Hous. Opportunity and Cmty. Development and the Subcomm. On HUD Oversight and
Structure of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 31-48
(1995) (statement of John Weicher, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute).
155. H.R. 2406, The United States Housing Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. On Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.,
104th Cong. 43-48 (1995) (statement of Hon. Henry Cisneros, Secretary of HUD), https:/
/archive.org/streamhrunitedstatesh00oppogoog#page/n46/mode/2up/searchlCisneros
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2406].
156. Hearing on H.R. 2406, supra note 155, at 43-47.
157. Id. at 47-48. The Obama Administration has taken a different, more coopera-
tive approach. In 2010, HUD Secretary Shaun Donovan announced that applicants
seeking HUD grants must "comply with state and local laws that protect individuals
from being denied housing based on their lawful source of income." Press Release, HUD
Secretary Shaun Donovan, HUD tells grant applicants: don't discriminate based on le-
gal 'sources of income' or risk funding (June 11, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
HUD?src=/press/press-releasesmediaadvisories/20l0/HUDNo.10-121; see also U.S.
Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., FR-5415-N-01, Notice of Funding Availability (NOFA),
Policy Requirements and General Section to HUD's FY2010, NOFAs for Discretionary
Programs (2010), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/grants/nofal0/gensec.pdf.
158. S. Res. 1260, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted). Its companion bill, H.R. 2406, was
introduced on Sept. 27, 1995 and sponsored by Representative Rick Lazio (R-NY). Al-
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introduced by Senator Connie Mack (R-FL) and co-sponsored by Sena-
tors Bond (R-MO), D'Amato (R-NY) and Domenici (R-NM).
Though it was ultimately unsuccessful in that session, the re-
moval provision gained great support from owner interest groups, in-
cluding the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials ("NAHRO") 159 and other private groups, such as the Schiff
Group (a consulting group on federal housing programs).160 Support-
ive testimony was also offered to the Senate Subcommittee on Hous-
ing Opportunity and Community Development by the director of the
federal Government Accountability Office's Housing and Community
Development Division, Jim Wells, who stated on the record that the
antidiscrimination provision "made some property owners reluctant to
participate.' 6 1 None of these witnesses referred to the section by its
"antidiscrimination" title, but rather each referred to it as the "take
one, take all" requirement or rule. None made use of the fair housing
language. They advocated its removal through wide-reaching com-
ments addressing ways to increase flexibility and choice for tenants
determining where they want to live (related to the substitution of
portable, tenant-based rent subsidies for subsidies tied to a single
property) and they attributed tenants' difficulty in securing housing to
the "reluctance" of property owners to participate and hence to the
"take one, take all" rule.
While civil rights were no longer in the same spotlight by the
1990s, welfare-related services were. Still, the hearings held by the
House Committee on Banking and Financial Services included only
representatives of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment ("HUD") and property owners. No tenants' organizations were
though both bills passed-the vote in the Senate was unanimous-they were unable to
reconcile the two versions before the end of the legislative session. See supra note 151.
159. NAHRO's "main interest is urban renewal and public housing, and its main
thrust is to push for more and more of each .... NAHRO has been somewhat suspicious
of innovations which threaten to work outside the traditional framework of local public
housing agencies." (NAHRO is a "member advocacy organization" for "employees of lo-
cal public housing agencies and renewal agencies"). HAROLD WOLMAN, POLITICS OF FED-
ERAL HousING 60 (1971).
160. Both NAHRO and the Schiff Group in their 1995 statements testified that re-
moval of the provision would make it more attractive to landlords to participate in the
Section 8 program. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of
the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 74-88 (statement of Roberty Arm-
strong on behalf of NAHRO), available at https:Hlarchive.org/stream/hr2406unitedstat
00unit#page/nl/mode/2up; Public Housing Reform and Empowerment Act of 1995:
Hearing on S. 1260 Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th
Cong. 32-33 (1995) (statement of Joseph G. Schiff).
161. Restructuring HUD's Assisted lInsured Multifamily Housing Portfolio: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Hous. Opportunity and Cmty. Dev. of the Comm. on Banking,
Hous., and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 67 (1995) (statement of Jim Wells, Assoc. Dir.,




included. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af-
fairs heard testimony from seven tenants' organizations,16 2 but none
of them noted the perils of losing the antidiscrimination provision.163
As a result, the perspective presented to members of Congress was
limited to just one side. The rhetoric and framing of those opposed to
the law focused only on justifications for low landlord turnout and
omitted any reference to discriminatory impediments facing
tenants.
164
After many defeated attempts, the repeal finally passed both
houses in October 1998,165 more than two years after Judge Gleeson's
predictions of its coming in Salute.166 The 1998 bill was primarily
concerned with administrative reform, consolidating the Section 8
voucher and certificate programs into a single voucher program to "re-
duce administrative burdens and increase the acceptability of vouch-
ers in the private housing market."1 6 7 Section 554 of the repealing
Act deleted subsection (t), the antidiscrimination provision, entirely.
The Congressional Report on the repeal cited only reports submitted
in the preparation of the 1995 version of the bill and hearings before
the Senate Banking Committee.168 Little to no opposition was
presented in the 105th Congress as members welcomed the reform,
citing the way in which the new law "increas[es] resident choice by
improving the ability of tenant-based assistance programs to meet the
demand for affordable housing."1 6 9 The last time that provision was
mentioned was in the Senate Committee's Report to the full Senate on
December 20, 1995. In addition, it was believed the new legislation
would "protect the poorest of the poor" by requiring public housing
authorities to continue to make available significant numbers of units
for all low-income levels, but to reserve a substantial amount for those
in the lowest tier of income-earners.1 70 What was not seen by con-
gressional leadership at the time was that, although more housing
162. The following organizations offered testimony: The National Housing Law Pro-
ject; the American Association of Retired Persons; the Center for Community Change;
the National Low-Income Housing Coalition; the Massachusetts Union of Public Hous-
ing Tenants; the Empowerment Network Foundation; and the Consortium for Citizens
with Disabilities. See Public Housing Reform and Empowerment Act of 1995-S. 1260:




165. See Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
note (1998)).
166. Salute 11, 918 F. Supp. at 665.
167. 141 CONG. REc. S13858 (1995).
168. Id. (referring to hearings from Oct. 26, 1995).




could be offered to these lowest earners as a result of the new legisla-
tion, there would no longer be any protection in place to guarantee
them access to those units.
From this limited record, it would appear that the loss of the an-
tidiscrimination provision became collateral damage in the process of
a more extensive goal to increase the number of landlords participat-
ing nationwide. Neither at the time of the testimony presented in
1995 nor in 1998 was there any discussion about the congressional
intent behind the enactment of § 1437f(t). Rather than accommodate
both goals-protection against antidiscrimination and expansion of
participants-property owner interest groups along with HUD suc-
cessfully convinced members of Congress that the poorly drafted lan-
guage of the antidiscrimination provision rendered it harmful to the
greater goals of the national housing plan. In so doing, Congress
passed control of the antidiscrimination policies to the subfederal
levels.
In fact, an important emphasis on devolution can also be seen in
the 1998 law more generally. The 1998 law intended to give the local
public housing authorities increased independence over the manage-
ment of their public assistance programs, particularly the Section 8
program. As Senator Mack put it, "[m]icromanagement by both Con-
gress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD]
ha[ve] saddled housing authorities... mak[ing] it impossible for even
the best of them to run their developments effectively and effi-
ciently."171 By contrast, it was hoped that the bill would "address[ ]
the crisis in public housing" by "returning greater responsibility over
the operation and management of public housing to [local] housing au-
thorities."1 72 Today, local housing agencies are required to comply
with all federal civil rights and fair housing laws, and to further fair
housing in carrying out the agency plan, which covers public housing
and the tenant-based voucher program without measures to protect
from discrimination the groups that program is intended to serve. In
this respect, the repeal also had the effect of devolving or decentraliz-
ing the prohibition on discrimination.
Across the country, prohibitions of this type have been taken up
by the states and their political subdivisions.17 3 In the next Part, I




173. There was no attempt to introduce antidiscrimination language in the Section
8 Voucher Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1851, 110th Cong. (2007), as discussed in Part III.
See supra notes 34-86.
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VI. STATES AND LOCALITIES TAKE ACTION
Several states and cities had enacted antidiscrimination provi-
sions protecting low-income residents well before the federal legisla-
tion was enacted in 1987. Many more enacted replica legislation in
the aftermath of the federal statute's passage; and still more have en-
acted protective measures since the federal repeal. Although one
might be able to draw patterns, and therefore conclusions, from these
trends, not only is there little indication of a causative trend but there
is little evidence to suggest that there has been any communication or
cross-referencing vertically or horizontally among those with the pro-
vision and those considering enactment. This Section explores the
state and local initiatives and their lack of reference to the federal
law.
The story of state initiatives to combat sources of income discrimi-
nation dates back to before the introduction of the federal law, to
1971, with Massachusetts.17 4 In broad strokes, the implementation of
state statutes protecting fair housing for the poor roughly corresponds
with the enactment of the major federal housing initiatives that they
mirror. They have advanced in two major waves: three states17 5 in
the early 1970s following the passage of Congress's Fair Housing
Act 176 in 1968, and nine17 7 in the aftermath of the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988.178 Despite their coincidental enactment,
each state law grew out of unique efforts developed by proponents
within each individual state and not through concerted action at the
national or even regional level. The map that results illustrates the
diverse geography and political makeup of the states where such legis-
lation has become law.
Massachusetts was the first state to implement protection against
source-of-income discrimination. On August 31, 1971, the Massachu-
setts General Court (the state's legislature) passed into law what
would become section 4(10) of Chapter 151B of the Massachusetts
174. MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 151B, § 1 (2010).
175. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4581-A (2011); MiNN. STAT. § 363A.01 (2011); Wis.
STAT. § 106.50 (2011).
176. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1988)).
177. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 12955 (Deering 2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-63(3)
(2011); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2012); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.5-02 (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1452 (2011); OR. REv. STAT. § 659A.421
(2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2(21) (LexisNexis 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503
(2011).




General Laws.179 That law created a prohibition on discrimination
against tenants who receive public housing subsidies "solely because
the individual is such a recipient" or "because of any requirement of
[the] ... subsidy program."
80
The law was challenged in 1987 by a landlord who claimed, under
a field preemption rationale, that the state law's antidiscrimination
measure was precluded by the federal Section 8 program as a
whole.'8' The landlord further claimed that provisions in the federal
law governing Section 8 housing indicated that the program was sim-
ply voluntary, whereas, the landlord maintained, the Housing Court's
ruling against him would make the program mandatory.'8 2 The Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed summary judgment
against the landlord on the basis of the misapplication by the Housing
Court of the appropriate substantive standards for finding a violation
of chapter 151B, section 4(1O).183 The Supreme Judicial Court focused
its analysis on the relevance of the word "solely" and concluded that
the Attorney General had not met his burden of showing that the
property owner was motivated "solely" by these discriminatory ba-
ses.184 Stating that "[t]he Federal statute merely creates the scheme
and sets out the guidelines for the funding and implementation of the
program by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) through local housing authorities,"18 5 the court also
determined that the Massachusetts law was not preempted by the
specifications of the federal program: "It does not preclude State
regulation."'8
6
In response to the court's decision, by 1990, the Massachusetts
General Court amended the law to remove the word "solely" and ad-
ded new language making it unlawful for a landlord to discriminate
against a housing subsidy recipient either "because the individual is
such a recipient, or because of any requirement of such public assis-
tance, rental assistance, or housing subsidy program."18 7 Thus, when
179. See Keeping the Promise: Preserving and Enhancing Housing Mobility in the
Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program, POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUN-
CIL, http://www.prrac.orgpdf/AppendixB.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). State legisla-
ture records are extremely limited prior to the 1990s and even today are not nearly as
extensive in most states as compared to in the federal government. Unfortunately,
there is no record in the Massachusetts State Archives regarding the reasoning behind
or the sponsorship of this legislation.
180. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(10) (2010) (emphasis added).
181. Att'y Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105-06 (Mass. 1987).
182. Brown, 511 N.E.2d at 1105-06.
183. Id. at 1109-10.
184. Id. at 1109.
185. Id. at 1106.
186. Id.
187. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4(10) (2010). See also 1989 Mass. Acts 1822.
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the next challenge came to the law in 2007, the Supreme Judicial
Court took notice of the revised language and decided in favor of the
tenant.1
88
Minnesota followed on the heels of Massachusetts, enacting into
law on May 24, 1973 the Minnesota Human Rights Act' 8 9 that made
unlawful discrimination on the basis of an individual's "status with
regard to public assistance."190 Disputes arising under the law would
not, however, be litigated in the Minnesota Court of Appeals until
2003. In an unpublished opinion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals af-
firmed a ruling for summary judgment in favor of the property owner
on the basis of "undisputed facts [that] do not establish a violation of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act."19 1 More recently, the state courts
dealt a blow to the law, finding an exception where a landlord made
out a legitimate business basis for excluding the voucher holder.
19 2
In 1975, the Maine state legislature passed into law the Maine
Human Rights Act,19 3 which made unlawful any discrimination
against an individual on the basis of that "individual's status as [a]
recipient" of federal aid.' 94 A case brought under this law came before
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine four years later.1 95 There, the
court reversed the superior court's judgment for the tenants, conclud-
ing that the words "solely because," like in the Massachusetts law,
precluded relief unless the individual's welfare status was the only
determining factor.
196
The District of Columbia enacted its Human Rights Act of
1977.197 The Act includes a prohibition on source-of-income discrimi-
nation.198 Litigation regarding this language has come before the
D.C. Court of Appeals twice and before the federal court of appeals,
188. DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, 876 N.E.2d 421, 428-30 (Mass. 2007). Another
violation of the state provision was found in Whitford v. Ford, 13 Mass. Discr. L. Rep.
1001 (Jan. 3, 1991), a Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD")
case. In Whitford, the Commissioner found that the landlord had discriminated on the
basis of the prospective tenant's Section 8 status and that the landlord's proffered rea-
soning (a general aversion to government involvement in his rental property affairs)
could "not constitute a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for refusing to rent to a
Section 8 tenant." Whitford, 13 Mass. Disc. L. Rep. at 1026.
189. 1973 Minn. Laws 2159 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(47) (2002)).
190. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(47) (2002).
191. Babcock v. BBY Chestnut Ltd. P'ship, No. CX-03-90, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS
899, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 29, 2003).
192. Edwards v. Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P'ship, 783 N.W.2d 171, 181 (Minn. App. 2010).
193. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5 § 4582 (2011).
194. Id. § 4581-A.
195. Vance v. Speakman, 409 A.2d 1307, 1308 (Me. 1979).
196. Vance, 409 A.2d at 1310.
197. D.C. CODE §§ 2-1401.01 to 2-1411.06 (LexisNexis 2008).
198. D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02 (LexisNexis 2008). This language was enacted before




the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, once.199 The more interesting D.C. case is the case of Bridget
Feemster v. BSA Ltd.200 in the D.C. Circuit.2 01 This was not the first
case in federal court evaluating this provision of a state law, but un-
like the Wisconsin case described below, the D.C. Circuit ruled in
favor of the plaintiff on the Human Rights Act claim, finding that:
Just as it would constitute a facial violation of Title VII to
discriminate in leasing on the basis of a renter's race - re-
gardless of whether the landlord professed a 'benign' motive
for so doing - it is a facial violation of the Human Rights Act
to discriminate on the basis of the renter's source of
income.
20 2
Feemster is the only federal case where a subfederal source-of-income
antidiscrimination provision has been upheld. Other than this case,
the federal courts have only served to limit mechanisms for Section 8
voucher holders to seek relief against discrimination.
The response to source-of-income discrimination becomes even
more localized when one examines the lengthening list of cities and
counties that have created protections against this mistreatment.20 3
Urbana, Illinois was the first city to enact such a law in 1975.204
Madison, Wisconsin also enacted a protective law shortly thereafter in
1977,205 followed by Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1978.206 The Ann Arbor
law, supported by local legal services organizations working in the
area of housing, passed through the City Council with little fanfare
and no opposition;20 7 it is not clear from Council records precisely why
the organizations brought the matter to the Council at that time or
199. In Borger Management Inc. v. Sindram, 886 A.2d 52, 64-65 (D.C. 2005), the
D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case for additional consideration on the source-of-
income matter after the trial court had ruled against the tenant on that claim. Another
case, Blodgett v. University Club, 930 A.2d 210, 215 (D.C. 2007), also raised the source-
of-income claim but not in a housing context. In that case, an individual was refused
membership to a private club on an alleged discriminatory premise.
200. 548 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
201. Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P'ship, 548 F.3d 1063 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
202. Feemster, 548 F.3d at 1070.
203. Though some cities lack detailed records describing the impetus to their action,
others maintain lengthy transcripts and additional information that helps to explain
where their project came from. The result is a spotty collection of dates and narratives,
through which a few notable stories stand out.
204. URBANA, ILL. ORD. No. 7576-43, §§ 1-28 (enacted 1975).
205. MADISON, WIs. CODE OF ORD. § 39.03 (2014).
206. ANN ARBOR, MICH., CODE §§ 9:150-52 (2009). It is impossible to conduct a com-
prehensive search of all municipalities and their legislative activity; my research in sev-
eral databases of local media and city council ordinances shows Ann Arbor as the first
city to implement this type of provision.
207. Report on the Public Hearing regarding the Human Rights Ordinance, Jan. 23,
1978, as provided by the Ann Arbor City Clerk's Office (on file with author).
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where the idea came from.20 8 Shortly thereafter, Wisconsin, perhaps
inspired by Madison's example, enacted its antidiscrimination provi-
sion in 1979.
Wisconsin's story unites the federal statutory history with one
state's efforts to put protections in place for low-income renters. In
1979, the Wisconsin legislature passed into law an act that prohibited
discrimination on the basis of "lawful source of income."209 The term
was left undefined in the statute itself, but a definition could be found
in the state's Administrative Code.210 The original statute also in-
cluded the following statement of intent:
It is the intent of this section to render unlawful discrimina-
tion in housing. It is the declared policy of this state that all
persons shall have an equal opportunity for housing regard-
less of sex, race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, sex
or marital status of the person maintaining a household, law-
ful source of income, age or ancestry and it is the duty of the
local units of government o assist in the orderly prevention or
removal of all discrimination in housing through the powers
granted under s. 66.433 .... This section shall be deemed an
exercise of the police powers of the state for the protection of
the welfare, health, peace, dignity and human rights of the
people of this state.
211
During the first few years the law was in place, very little litiga-
tion of significance resulted. By 1994, however, a case was brought to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
bringing suit against a landlord for discrimination in violation of not
just the Wisconsin state law but also the federal law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(t).21 2 The federal district court held that the landlord violated
the federal law, but not the state provision.213 Both positions were
upheld on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, making this case the only one in which a federal appel-
late court found for the plaintiff on the § 1437f claim.214 The court's
divergent decision was premised on its bewildering finding that the
Section 8 voucher did not "clearly equate to the other forms of aid
208. Id.
209. 1979 Wis. Legis. Serv. 931-33 (West); 1979 Wis. SENATE BILL 244, ch. 188.
210. "[I]nclud[ing], but [ ] not limited to, lawful compensation or lawful remunera-
tion in exchange for goods or services provided; profit from financial investments; any
negotiable draft, coupon or voucher representing monetary value such as food stamps;
social security; public assistance; unemployment compensation" benefits. WIs. ADMIN.
CODE DWD § 220.02(8) (2009).
211. 1979 Wis. Legis. Serv. 931-33 (West); 1979 Wis. SENATE BILL 244, ch. 188 (em-
phasis added). Note the emphasis on municipalities to effectuate the state plan.
212. See Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt., 54 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir. 1995).




specified in the statute."2 15 It did not find Section 8 vouchers to qual-
ify as public assistance vouchers but instead analogized them to food
stamps. It reasoned that "[u]nlike food stamps, however, [Slection 8
vouchers do not have a monetary value independent of the voucher
holder and the apartment sought."2 16 Moreover, the court noted that
the form of payment-from the local housing authority to the housing
owner "pursuant to a contract between those parties, rather than to
the voucher holder [directly] "-made it fall outside the scope of the
act.2 17 While the court found that Section 8 vouchers "could arguably
be included within the Wisconsin Act," it would decline to ascribe that
intent to the state legislature.2 18 Neither the circuit court nor the dis-
trict court certified the question to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, but
instead each pronounced on the meaning of the state law. It is diffi-
cult to understand such a holding in light of the statement of intent by
the Wisconsin legislature expressing its conviction to end "all discrim-
ination in housing."2 19 The Seventh Circuit thus staked out the fed-
eral law as the exclusive protective force for the participants in the
federal program.
Rounding out the polities enacting legislation in the first wave
were West Seneca, New York in 1979220 and Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania in 1980.221 For five years, there would be silence around the
country in both local communities and states until the introduction of
what would become the federal Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988. Shortly thereafter, a new wave of state and local laws came into
effect, beginning with Oklahoma in 1985;222 Hamburg, New York 22 3
and Wauwatosa, Wisconsin in 1986;224 Vermont2 25 and Ripon, Wis-
consin22 6 in 1988; Utah227 and Connecticut in 1989;228 Bellevue,
215. Id. at 1282.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (emphasis added). The court gave three potential problems with a contrary
interpretation that it was trying to avoid: first, it believed that such a holding would
make a voluntary federal program mandatory; second, it found that "the state could
read income to include these vouchers, but could accept nonparticipation in the program
as a legitimate reason for the owner's action, thereby relieving him of liability in the
same way that legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons dissolve a prima facie case under
Title VII"; and third, it found that limited application of the provision would contradict
the purpose of the program. Id. at 1282-83.
219. Wis. STAT. § 106.50(1) (2009) (emphasis added).
220. WEST SENECA, N.Y. CODE § 71-3 (2014).
221. PHILA., PA. CODE ch. 9-1100 (2014).
222. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1452 (2014).
223. HAMBURG, N.Y., ORDINANCES § 109-3 (2010).
224. WAUWATOSA, WiS. MUN. CODE § 15.22 (2014).
225. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4501(6), 4503 (2011).
226. RIPON, WIS. MUN. CODE § 12.48 (2014).
227. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-2(21) (WEST 2011).
228. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-64b (2011).
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Washington in 1990;229 as well as Portland, Oregon;230 Montgomery
County, Maryland;23 1 and the state of New Jersey in 1991.232
Throughout the 1990s, many more cities and counties and three
more states came on board, beginning with Howard County, Mary-
land;23 3 Dane County, Wisconsin;23 4 Cambridge, Massachusetts;
235
Quincy, Massachusetts;2 36 and King County, Washington2 37 in 1992;
followed by: North Dakota2 38 and State College, Pennsylvania
1993;239 Iowa City, Iowa;240 Champaign, Illinois;2 4 1 Revere, Massa-
chusetts;24 2 and San Francisco, California 1994;243 Wheeling, Illi-
nois;24 4 and Oregon24 5 1995; Chicago, Illinois; 2 46 and Benton County,
Oregon 1998;247 and California248 and Seattle, Washington24 9 1999.
Note how there is no apparent correlation with the timing of the re-
moval of the federal provision.250 Like the federal story, these
achievements have not been easy-coming in all cases. The Connecti-
cut statute2 5' has been challenged twice before the Connecticut Su-
preme Court, but upheld on both occasions.25 2 A new bill was
229. BELLEVUE, WASH. CITY CODE § 9.20.045 (2014).
230. PORTLAND, OR., MUN. CODE § 23.01.060 (2011).
231. MONTGOMERY CNTY., MD. CODE § 27.12 (2011).
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12 (West 2011).
233. HOWARD CNTY., MD. CODE § 12.207 (2014).
234. DANE CNTY., Wis. CODE § 31-02 (2014).
235. CAMBRIDGE, MASS. MUN. CODE § 14.04.040.
236. QUINCY, MASS. MUN. CODE § 2.150.010.
237. KING CNTY., WASH. ORDINANCES ch. 12, art. 20 (2010).
238. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.5-02 (2009).
239. STATE COLLEGE, PA., ORDINANCES ch. 5, part E, § 501-10 (2010).
240. IOWA CITY, IOWA CODE §§ 2-5-1, 2-1-1 (2014).
241. CHAMPAIGN CODE, ILL. § 17-21(c) (2011).
242. REVERE, MASS. MUN. CODE § 9.28.080.
243. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE § 3304 (2014).
244. WHEELING, ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS ORDINANCES Ch. 6.14 (1995).
245. OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.421 (2009).
246. CHI., ILL. CODE §§ 5-8-030, 2-150-020(m) (2010).
247. Benton Co., Or., Ordinance 98-0139 (Aug. 14, 1998).
248. CALIF. GOVT CODE § 12955 (2009). Notably, however, the California case law
suggests that its prohibition does not cover Section 8 voucher holders. See SABI v. Ster-
ling, 183 Cal. App. 4th 916 (2010).
249. SEATTLE, WASH. CODE § 14.08.040 (2014); Seattle, Wash. Ordinance 119628
(Aug. 31, 1999).
250. The Wheeling Ordinance references the concerns about the federal statute,
however, and interaction with the structural federal statute: "Notwithstanding any-
thing to the contrary contained in this title, nothing contained in this chapter shall
require any person who does not participate in the federal Section 8 Housing Assistance
Program (42 U.S.C. 1437f) to accept any subsidy,. " WHEELING, ILL. HUMAN RIGHTS
ORD. Ch. 6.14.
251. The statute, added in 1989, was an amendment to the state's human rights
statute. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46a-64c (2008).
252. See Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs. (Sullivan
1), 739 A.2d 238, 242 (Conn. 1999); Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities v.
Sullivan Assocs. (Sullivan I/), 939 A.2d 541, 548 (Conn. 2008).
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introduced in the Connecticut House in 2000 to reverse the outcome of
the court cases and repeal the legislation, but was rejected in commit-
tee.25 3 The New Jersey statute has come under fire from property
owners who have said that to conform to the statute, which carries a
fine of up to $10,000, "impose[s] an 'onerous burden' on [property own-
ers] and open[s] the litigation floodgates" on the basis of baseless
claims.
254
Since 2000, still more have enacted similar legislation, including:
Naperville, Illinois, 25 5 Nassau County, New York,25 6 and both Corte
Madera and East Palo Alto, California (2000);257 Multnomah County,
Oregon (2001);258 Memphis, Tennessee and Wilmington, Delaware
(2002);259 Woodland, California (2004);260 Frederick County, Mary-
land (2005);261 Grand Rapids, Michigan (2005);262 St. Louis, Missouri
(2006);263 Buffalo, New York (2006);264 Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
(2007);265 Harwood Heights, Illinois (2009);266 Miami - Dade County,
Florida (2009);267 Redmond, Washington (2012);268 Westchester, New
York (2013);269 and Austin, Texas (2014).270 More may be on the way:
the states of Hawaii, New York, and Maryland, and the common-
wealth of Virginia introduced legislation prohibiting source of income
discrimination in recent years but these have not yet been enacted.
None of the legislative background materials (where available) makes
reference to the loss of federal protection. Because counties, where
they exist, are largely rural or green suburban jurisdictions where
253. H.B. 5835, 2000 Leg., Feb. Session (Conn. 2000).
254. See Manny Fernandez, Bias Is Seen As Landlords Bar Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2007, at Metro Al.
255. NAPERVILLE, ILL., MUN. CODE tit. 10, ch. 5 (2010).
256. NASSAU CNTY. ADMIN. CODE § 21-9.7 (2014).
257. CORTE MADERA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 5.30.020-5.30.040 (2014); EAST PALO ALTO,
CAL., MUN. CODE § 14.16 (2009).
258. MULTNOMAH CNTY. OR. CODE § 15.342 (2014).
259. MEMPHIS, TENN., MUN. CODE § 10-36-5 (2014); WILMINGTON, DEL., MUN. CODE
ch. 35, art. III, §§ 35-78 (2014).
260. WOODLAND, CAL., MUN. CODE § 6A-4-60 (2014).
261. FREDERICK CO., MD., MUN. CODE § 2-2-68 (2011).
262. GRAND RAPIDS, MICH., MUN. CODE § 9.362 (2014).
263. ST. LOUIS, Mo., CITY REV. CODE ch. 3.44 (2014).
264. BUFFALO, N.Y., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 154-12 (2014).
265. SUN PRAIRIE, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 9.20.010 (2014).
266. HARWOOD HEIGHTS, ILL., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 19 (2009).
267. MIAMI-DADE CNTY., FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11A-11(12) (2009).
268. REDMOND, WASH., MUN. CODE Ch. 6.38.010, 6.38.020 (2014).
269. LAWS OF WESTCHESTER CNrY., N.Y., No. 6057-2013, Ch. 700, art. II § 700.19-35
(2014).
270. Austin, Tex. Res. No. 20140417-048 (December 15, 2014). Implementation of
the amendment o the ordinance was stayed, however, by a federal district court upon a
petition for a preliminary injunction by the Austin Apartment Association, an organiza-




Section 8 housing vouchers are not applicable, as expected, there are
fewer of them enacting these provisions, and the ones that do enact
such provisions, do so at the lead of the major cities they encompass.
Even after all these local communities-large and small-have
taken action, there remain many more with large populations depen-
dent on vouchers that lack the protection they need for those facing
loss of housing as a direct consequence of blatant discriminatory prac-
tice. A study conducted by the nonprofit Fair Housing Justice Center
found hundreds of instances of discrimination by landlords and bro-
kers who overtly stated in their advertisements on craigslist.com, the
popular online advertising site, that Section 8 voucher holders need
not pursue their listing.271 My own informal study found the same:
In cities across the nation-both those with protective laws in place
and those without-landlords are writing into their ads that they do
not accept Section 8 housing. However, for those that are part of the
program, these advertisements constitute facial violations of antidis-
crimination laws where those laws exist.
VII. A SCATTERED MAP
A. PATTERNS
At first glance, these data suggest there is no discernible pattern
to the proliferation of antidiscrimination measures designed to protect
the poor, other than perhaps a tenuous parallel with the enactment of
federal fair housing legislation. Each of these states and local commu-
nities is politically, geographically, and demographically diverse.
Compare North Dakota and California: North Dakota has approxi-
mately only 6,000 voucher holders and one of the shortest waiting pe-
riods of any state for receiving a voucher; California, on the other
hand, is home to over 260,000 voucher holders who endure a waiting
period of more than two years.
272
The local story is even more disparate. Municipalities from rural
college towns to suburban counties to major metropolises have under-
taken to protect their low-income populations. The proliferation of lo-
cal-level protective measures began in the second half of the 1970s in
the college towns of Urbana, Illinois; Madison, Wisconsin; and Ann
Arbor, Michigan. Take Ann Arbor with a population of 113,934 that is
73% white, where the home ownership rate is approximately 46%, and
271. Fred Freiberg & Diane L. Houk, No License to Discriminate, FAIR HOUSING JUS-
TICE CENTER 6-8 (2008), http://www.fairhousingjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/
License to Discriminate finalDRAFT.pdf.




20.2% lives below the poverty line.2 73 Contrast the profile of Ann Ar-
bor with an even smaller town that enacted the same law the follow-
ing year: West Seneca, New York, whose population is roughly
45,000.274 West Seneca is 97.2% white and 6.3% of the town's popula-
tion lives below the poverty line; the home ownership rate is approxi-
mately 79%.275 The next city to follow suit is nearly four hundred
miles to the south of West Seneca: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The
population of Philadelphia is roughly 1.5 million; 41% white; 26.5%
below the poverty line; with a homeownership rate of approximately
55%.276
A similar range is found in the county data. Montgomery County,
the first county to adopt the antidiscrimination measure based on the
available data, is Maryland's most affluent county and its most popu-
lous.27 7 Only about 6,000 residents rely on a Section 8 voucher or cer-
tificate (as of 2010 Department of Housing and Urban Development
("HUD") data).2 78 By contrast, Cook County, Illinois, which adopted a
similar measure2 79 two years later, is home to over 63,000 Section 8
residents.28 0 Yet, demography need not be determinative for a state,
city, or county to respond where there is evidence of a problem. The
enactment of source-of-income discrimination protection could be, and
likely is, the result of the confluence of many factors.
Take the story of Champaign, Illinois, for example-a story of
horizontal federalism, a label used by commentators to characterize
peer exchanges mediated between and among cities or between and
273. STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: ANN ARBOR, MICH., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2010), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2603000.html. Homeown-
ership rate is a five-year estimate computed by dividing the number of owner-occupied
housing units by the number of occupied housing units or households.
274. STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: WEST SENECA CDP, N.Y., U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU (2010), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3680907.html.
275. Id.
276. STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS: PHILA., PA., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010),
available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/4260000.html.
277. ABOUT MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MONTGOMERY CNTY. MD., http://www.montgom
erycountymd.gov/resident/about.html.
278. A Picture of Subsidized Households: Montgomery County, Maryland, DEP'T OF
Hous. AND URBAN DEV., (2000), http://www.huduser.org/portal/picture2000/form-ls.odb
?year=2000 (select "Census Tract (based on Census 2000 designations)"; select "MD Ma-
ryland"; click "next screen"; select "MD Montgomery Census Tract 7001.01
24031700101 - Montgomery County No census tract 24031999999'"; click "Section 8 Cer-
tificates and Vouchers"; click "next screen"; select "ALL"; click "next screen"; select
"View data on screen in an HTML table").
279. Cook Cnty., Ill., Human Rights Ordinance 93-0-13 (Mar. 16, 1993) (codified at
COOK CNTY., ILL. MUN. CODE, Ch. 42, art. II § 42-38 (2013)).
280. A PICTURE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS, DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., http:/
/www.huduser.org/portal/picture2000/form-ls.odb?year=2000 (select "Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs)"; select "1600 Chicago IL PMSA"; click "next screen"; click
"Section 8 Certificates and Vouchers"; click "next screen"; select "ALL"; click "next
screen"; select "View data on screen in an HTML table").
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among states,28 1 at work. The history of Champaign's confrontation
with this issue reflects translocal peer pressure for progressive
change. A city Human Rights Ordinance prohibited discrimination on
the basis of source-of-income since 1994 but had not defined "source-
of-income" anywhere in the city code.2 8 2 In 2001, the city's Human
Relations Commission ruled that the source-of-income provision did
not cover Section 8 vouchers;28 3 however, in 2006, it revisited the is-
sue after learning of a 2004 case that addressed the same issue in
Chicago,28 4 in which the Chicago Commission interpreted the wording
as including Section 8 voucher holders.285 In light of the Chicago deci-
sion, the Champaign Commission reversed its prior determination
and held that source of income did include Section 8 vouchers.28 6 The
Commission then voted to recommend to the City Council that the
City's Human Rights Ordinance be amended to specifically include
Section 8 in the source-of-income definition.
287
The outcome could have been different if the Champaign
lawmakers had looked instead to the legislation in force in Cook
County, Illinois. Cook County contains 128 municipalities in its re-
gion, but its seat is in the City of Chicago.288 Its population of approx-
imately 5.3 million people makes it the second most populous county
in the United States.28 9 Cook County has its own ordinance address-
ing source-of-income discrimination.290 County government in Illinois
has principal responsibility for the protection of persons and property,
but voucher holders living just outside the city limits of Chicago lack
the protection their neighbors have only a few blocks away. Chicago
passed its discrimination prohibition in 1988.291 It includes a prohibi-
tion on source-of-income discrimination.2 92 The County's antidis-
281. See, e.g., Resnik, Civin, & Frueh, supra note 26.
282. See Mike Monson, Revision Would Affect City's Landlords, NEws-GAZETtE,
Nov. 18, 2005; CHAMPAIGN, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 17, art. V, § 17-73(5) (1994).
283. Monson, supra note 282.
284. Mark Abner, Champaign Landlords Now Permitted to Discriminate Against
Section 8 Voucher Holders, THE PUBLIC (Nov. 2007), available at http://publici.ucimc
.orgl?p=1188.
285. Godinez v. Sullivan-Lackey, 815 N.E.2d 822, 827 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
286. Abner, supra note 284.
287. Mike Monson, Section 8 Definitions Rejected by Champaign Council, NEWS-GA-
ZETTE, Mar. 1, 2006.
288. ABOUT COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountyil.gov/about-cook-county/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2015).
289. Id.
290. Cook Cnty., Ill., Human Rights Ordinance 93-0-13 (Mar. 16, 1993) (codified at
COOK CNTY., ILL. MUN. CODE, Ch. 42, art. II § 42-38).




crimination legislation, by contrast, dates back to March 16, 1993.293
It has never been amended to include a prohibition on source-of-in-
come discrimination. The puzzling disparity between these two con-
stituencies, perhaps the result of heavy lobbying from local real estate
professionals advocacy organizations, has led to inconsistencies in pro-
tection for residents living within half a mile from each other which
translate into homelessness for some but not others.
Like Champaign, other cities have looked to their sister cities
across the state, but some have not settled for the minimum protection
found there. When the city of St. Louis signed a contract with the
federal government as part of HUD's Fair Housing Assistance Pro-
gram in 2006, it looked to Kansas City as a model for change in this
direction.29 4 Local media hailed St. Louis city officials for taking the
steps necessary to protect local residents, including their adoption of
an antidiscrimination provision, though the passage of the same pro-
hibition on discrimination with respect to particular (non-income-re-
lated) classes was a condition of receiving federal aid.
29 5
Nevertheless, while Kansas City and the federal requirements
stopped short of protection for low-income residents, St. Louis went a
step further without explanation. It enacted a law that made it un-
lawful "[flor any person to discriminate against any other person in
the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in
the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of. . . legal source of income[.]"296 Thus, the Illinois and Missouri
towns exhibit horizontal federalism.
When the Portland, Oregon City Council considered an antidis-
crimination bill, it followed suit, but it looked upward to the state to
inquire whether the state code provided this protection2 9 7-an exam-
ple of vertical federalism. Finding it did not, the Council held a hear-
ing about the proposed bill, and proponents and opposing parties came
out in equal, sizeable numbers.298 The ordinance passed and the
Council issued its findings related to the bill. 29 9 For one, the City took
notice of other cities around the United States that had some measure
293. Cook Cnty., Ill., Human Rights Ordinance 93-0-13 (Mar. 16, 1993) (codified at
COOK CNTY., ILL. MUN. CODE, Ch. 42, art. II § 42-38).
294. FAIR HOUSING NEWS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV. (2006), available at
http://portal.hud.gov./hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC-14773.pdf.
295. Norm Parish, City May Help with Housing Complaints, ST. Louis POST-DIs-
PATCH, Apr. 28, 2006, at Metro C5.
296. St. Louis, Mo., Ordinance 67119 (Apr. 28, 2006) (codified at ST. Louis, Mo.,
CITY REV. CODE ch. 3.44.080 (2014)).
297. Portland, Or., Ordinance 164,709, draft amendments (Sept. 19, 1991) (on file
with author).
298. See CITY OF PORTLAND, OR., OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Recs. of Sept. 26,




in their codes prohibiting discrimination in housing. It also found it
important that "Oregon law [did] not clearly prohibit discrimination
on the basis of ... source of income at [that] time."300 In the absence
of state action,30 1 the City sought to create a measure that would pro-
tect its residents from the discrimination found in the Portland
area.
30 2
All three brief case studies in Illinois, Missouri, and Oregon dis-
play communication across governments-horizontally in Illinois and
Missouri where the cities saw themselves as competing with their sis-
ter cities to be at the forefront of social policy, or vertically in Oregon
where the city saw an opportunity for it to act as a model for the state.
In the latter case, the state legislature followed the Portland City
Council's lead within four years, although no records are available to
confirm that the city's action played a role in the later state action.
Despite these highlights where communication among govern-
ments led to policymaking in this area, they are only highlights, and
have not spawned greater dialogue. As noted above, many metropoli-
tan areas have not taken up these initiatives.30 3 With low visibility
and marketability, the propagation has moved slowly. The only cases
of explicit horizontal communication across borders identified were
those mentioned above-between cities within a single state. Only re-
cently did the nation's largest city, and the home of the most federal
voucher holders in the country,30 4 New York City, confront this prob-
lem head-on. As a result of "gentrification spreading into low-income
areas" of the city, "many landlords in struggling neighborhoods" were
under pressure to turn away voucher holders in favor of high-paying
clientele.30 5 The City Council took up a proposal for adding protection
against discrimination on the basis of source of income in 2007.306
Landlord groups opposed the bill, arguing that the proposed law
"would turn a voluntary program riddled with bureaucratic problems
300. Portland, Or., Ordinance 164,709, draft amendments, para. 3 (Sept. 19, 1991)
(on file with author).
301. Oregon enacted a state law in 1995, just after Portland. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659A.421 (1995).
302. Portland, Or., Ordinance 164,709, draft amendments, para. 4 (Sept. 19, 1991)
(on file with author).
303. It is not possible to determine whether and where measures were considered
but ultimately not implemented. My research through a national database of local news
attempted to capture these stories where reported, but rejected measures may not make
the news in most places, particularly smaller communities.






into a mandatory one."30 7 Tenants complained that more than thirty
landlords had turned down their applications and nonprofit advocacy
organizations drew attention to the way in which Section 8 discrimi-
nation was masking racial and gender discrimination, as well.308 The
bill passed, but was vetoed by Mayor Michael Bloomberg who criti-
cized it "for prohibiting private owners from making sound business
decisions about their property[.]"30 9 In a rare display of its authority,
the Council promoted the law, overriding the mayor's veto.3 10 It went
into force on March 26, 2008.311 In the first six months that the law
was in effect, the city's Commission on Human Rights "investigated or
received 77 complaints of source of income discrimination."3 12 But the
litigation under this provision is not limited to the Commission's
work. The Legal Aid Society in New York City has sued more than
ninety landlords in related claims.313 Meanwhile, attorneys repre-
senting landlords across the city offered, in their defense, that "people
in the industry simply don't know that this sort of practice is ille-
gal."314 They claim innocence on the premise that, "[alt least for the
last decade[,] it's been entirely lawful to refuse to rent to tenants with
vouchers."
315
These snapshots into state and local experiences reveal a scat-
tered map with many unique policies taken up as advocates across the
nation independently seek protection for tenants in their home com-
munities, rather than a national movement driven by centrally coordi-
nated or concerted action. Regardless of the small size of the trend,
the implications are striking for understanding how policymakers
adapt to federalism's opportunities and approach this area of shared
power. Federalism allows seeds to be planted in various localities, but
also limits and detracts from the achievement of a universal vision of
social rights.
307. Id.
308. Id. (quoting Bertha Lewis, Executive Director of New York ACORN, a commu-
nity organizing group: "We think that this is really.., a way for landlords to do race
and gender discrimination under a nice-sounding name").
309. Manny Fernandez, Despite New Law, Subsidized Tenants Find Doors Closed,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at B1.
310. Id.
311. Id. A follow-up article by the New York Times revealed its scant application
and the lack of awareness by landlords about the law. See Manny Fernandez, Judge
Upholds City Ban on Section 8 Rent Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A24. Despite its
being put into place, discrimination cases proliferate and many remain without access
to decent, affordable housing. Id.






B. GUIDANCE FROM THE COURTS
Though this Article is focused on legislative activity, the impact of
the courts should not be underestimated. As noted above, taken to-
gether, the federal courts did not look favorably at the federal law and
may have even contributed to its repeal. Only one circuit court and
one district court found for the tenants in cases where a claim of dis-
crimination was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f.316 By con-
trast, state courts have read the "general welfare" purpose into their
laws where the federal courts were unwilling to do so.31 7 But even
those are few and far between.318 State and local Rights' Commission
decisions are more difficult to track down, though most of their rules
provide an appeal process whereby aggrieved parties may enter the
state court system in the second round with the Commission as co-
appellee.
Some courts, both state and federal, have found that discrimina-
tion on the basis of an individual's source of income has served as a
pretext for discrimination on the part of a landlord who refused to rent
to an individual under one of the prohibited classes-most commonly,
on the basis of race.31 9 Those decisions are consistent in outcome and
purpose. However, in isolation, "low-income housing status" does not
trigger the same degree of protection and thus provides little hope
that the judiciary can resolve the irregularities in the trend. Rick
Schragger notes that the question of growing significance is whether
courts will find that more centralized legislation overrides progressive
local legislation in any respect. Even setting aside any question about
the distribution of authority (courts have not, generally, had trouble
addressing the preemption issue-and have found none), courts have
not read into the statutes a right to be free from discrimination in
acquiring housing.320 In the context of social rights-related issues,
316. See Glover v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corps., 746 F. Supp. 301, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Knapp v. Eagle Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1275 (7th Cir. 1995).
317. Former Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret Marshall put it this way: "The
[state legislature] was aware that [the law] imposed financial burdens on landlords, and
it made various policy judgments striking the balance between those burdens and the
public interest in making housing accessible and affordable for disabled persons ....
[W]e may not strike a different balance." DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Reality, 876 N.E.2d 421,
429-30 (Mass. 2007).
318. Only three state courts have found for plaintiff-tenants: New Jersey, Massa-
chusetts, and Connecticut.
319. See, e.g., Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., No. 89 Civ. 5386,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2648, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1990); M.T. v. Kentwood Constr.
Co., 651 A.2d 101, 102 (N.J. 1994); Franklin Tower One, LLC v. New Mexico, 725 A.2d
1104, 1109-11 (N.J. 1999).
320. The Progressive City, supra note 46, at 73. The question turns first on the de-
termination as to whether an individual is entitled to, or has a right to, a Section 8
voucher and, second, whether a recipient of a voucher has a right to use it where occu-
pancies are available. With the establishment of a right to a housing voucher, one could
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however, courts may not necessarily be asked to deduce a hierarchical
scheme of authority. These cases generally do not pose questions
about supremacy in which courts would need to negotiate the power
distribution.
Within this system of joint sovereignty shared by all levels of gov-
ernment, no level ever staked out or claimed a right to serve as the
exclusive policymaker, facilitating a haphazard set of policies that ric-
ocheted across the governmental levels. In the few instances where
more than one level might have been implicated, courts have come out
differently without a coherent guiding principle to sort out each level's
role. As a result, the contours of the social need have been individu-
ally identified and supported by the work of the local, state, and fed-
eral governments, each leveraging its comparative advantage.
This checkerboard of legislative and judicial activity demon-
strates the lack of a common commitment to a single approach from
the menu of options. Rather, it has resulted in the default option, not-
withstanding occasional communication with courts intervening as ar-
bitrators of low-impact cases largely limited to their facts.
VIII. REALIZING A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Although I have referred to how the enactment of antidiscrimina-
tion protections would lead to a "comprehensive" housing strategy, no
empirical studies have been conducted to confirm whether antidis-
crimination provisions would lead to an overall increase in the hous-
ing available for voucher holders. The Clinton Administration
prioritized greater landlord participation by eliminating elements of
the program to which landlords responded negatively. The level of
discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders may have been and
continues to be quite low such that one would find little to no differ-
ence in overall tenant placement as a result of maintaining or imple-
menting an antidiscrimination measure. Without further and
extensive empirical research, it is impossible to know for sure. It may
be true, as the Clinton Administration argued, that the overall num-
infer a right to apply that voucher, and therein provide safeguards to barriers that pre-
vent individuals from doing so. For the proposition that, under certain circumstances,
tenants have a right to use their vouchers as payment for rent and that a landlord must
accept them, see, Feemster v. BSA Ltd. P'ship, 548 F.3d 1063, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
("[Tihe tenants' right.., to pay their rent with [ I vouchers, is secure unless and until
their tenancies are validly terminated under [state or local] law.") (emphasis added).
This backdoor option is one way federal courts could institute protections against source
of income discrimination, akin to the creative doctrinal tools they have used in other
areas of the law. See generally William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank
Michelman on Social Rights, 1969-Present, 39 TULSA L. REV. 597 (2004); see also San




ber of tenants able to find housing would increase if more landlords
participate and the discrimination protection is left out.
32 1
The critical policy question that remains unanswered concerns
what to do in light of the widespread bankruptcy of protection for Sec-
tion 8 voucher recipients seeking housing in locales where state or
municipal antidiscrimination policies are lacking. Broadly speaking,
is the movement at the local level an example of progressive federal-
ism at work whereby a national norm will build through the communi-
cation and experimentation among the states and their subdivisions,
or is it a default position in the absence of federal direction? Which
level, if any, ought to take the lead on antidiscrimination housing poli-
cies, or are we satisfied with the status quo default approach?
This Part looks backward at the civil rights movement, where fed-
eral lawmaking occurred after states and local communities had ex-
perimented and their numbers had grown. It also takes up the
theories and politics of federalism as examples of strategies for ap-
proaching antidiscrimination as an area of overlapping sovereignty.
A. How TO MAKE A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
Across the years, the civil rights movement's translation from ad-
vocacy into law has, like the source-of-income antidiscrimination is-
sue, ricocheted between and among the many levels of government.322
Many believed that the federal authorities would rely on the well-es-
tablished state and local enforcement agencies in place of taking ac-
tion of their own.3 23 Thus, the federal government was moved to
action, passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964324 to combat the failure of
some cities and states to take action against discrimination. The
dearth of state and local legislation became a national problem that
had to be ameliorated out of necessity to reel in conservative states to
the newly minted national norm.3 25 The federal intervention was not
the first move, nor the second-best choice, but rather the last resort
321. The United States Housing Act of1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Hous.
and Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., 104th Cong. 43-48
(1995) (statement of Hon. Henry Cisneros, Secretary of HUD), available at https://
archive.org/stream/hrunitedstateshOOoppogoog#page/n46/mode/2up/search/Cisneros
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2406].
322. See Joseph P. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Propos-
als for a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171, 1172 n.6 (1965).
323. Scarcely a few years before, the larger concern would have involved conflicting
legislation rather than concurrent. Throughout the nineteenth century and into the
early twentieth century, many cities had housing ordinances designed to segregate the
races rather than to end segregation. See Laurence D. Pearl & Benjamin B. Terner,
Survey: Fair Housing Laws-Design for Equal Opportunity, 16 STAN. L. REV. 849, 852
(1964); see also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80-81 (1917).
324. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964)).
325. See Witherspoon, supra note 322, at 1171.
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option. This approach falls within Madison and De Tocqueville's vi-
sion of localized democratic governance, and it traces to the progres-
sive cities' and states' movement of today. Its underlying premise
reflects a theory of comparative advantage: because local governments
are better situated and better equipped to enforce civil rights protec-
tions, they should take on this role.
3 2 6
This policy structure places pressure on the states to be the pri-
mary actors in protecting social and civil rights. In fact, before 1945,
civil rights legislation (where it existed at all) was a state and local
power, though it was limited to provide protection to minority custom-
ers in businesses (and with very narrow enforcement capacity).
327
Then, in 1941, President Roosevelt created the Fair Employment
Practice Commission that would investigate discriminatory employ-
ment practices.3 28 Picking up on the federal government's lead, many
state commissions suddenly appeared on the map to replicate and re-
inforce the Federal Commission's authority. The success of these
state, and in some cases local, commissions encouraged lawmakers to
broaden the scope of the commissions3 29 to other areas such as educa-
tion and housing.
330
The inclusion of private housing in the areas of the commissions'
jurisdiction did not enter the legislative scene until 1959.331 That
year, four states implemented general antidiscrimination provisions
for residents seeking housing in the private market: Colorado, Con-
necticut, Massachusetts, and Oregon.33 2 The stepwise extension of
state-generated protections continued in this way, though it was slow-
moving, and not accepted without a struggle.3 33 Between 1959 and
1965, the constitutionality of seven state fair housing codes was chal-
lenged.334 Throughout these years, the ricocheting effect-slightly in-
determinate and haphazard, but communicative in nature and highly
publicized-had the consequence of positively establishing protections
against discrimination in the housing market at multiple levels of
government.
335
326. Id. at 1173.
327. Id. at 1178.
328. Id.
329. These state commissions varied significantly in their choice of definitions and
jurisdictional scope. See id. at 1180-81.
330. Id. at 1179-80. Their failure to address all areas of discrimination limited their
ability to precipitate a change of significance in constitutional culture. See id.
331. Pearl & Terner, supra note 323, at 850.
332. Id. at 850 n.9.
333. Id. at 851.
334. Id.
335. See id. at 850-51.
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By the time of the 1964 civil rights legislation, Congress was able
to draw upon this multiplicity of activity. The Civil Rights Act made
use of all facets and features of the federal system. It introduced new
considerations for states lacking the most comprehensive protective
measures; took away jurisdiction for states with lesser protections in
some cases; allowed states to be more stringent where they wanted to
implement additional protections; enhanced and encouraged commu-
nication between the federal courts and state agencies in adjudicative
proceedings; relied on commissions to mobilize minorities in their
area, developing their civic engagement; and employed the local com-
missions to facilitate alternative dispute mechanisms where
appropriate.
336
Concerns about preemption, taken up again in the early 1990s,
loomed large in the early years of government activity in civil rights,
both with respect to the states' codes pre-empting any and all local
ordinances and, when the federal government stepped in, with respect
to its occupying the field.3 37 A federal court in California found that a
California state statute preempted municipal civil rights codes, but in
Pennsylvania, the opposite conclusion was reached on the basis of the
text of the state law.3 38 This controversy was avoided in the 1964
Civil Rights Act through the addition of an explicit statement permit-
ting state and local laws to extend protections further, should they so
choose. Overall, it is important to note how civil rights issues have
never been categorically assigned to one level or another.
These historical narratives about the dynamism of federalism and
the exercise of all its attributes in the context of antidiscrimination
continue today with respect to housing assistance. Yet, again, the
story of source-of-income discrimination can be distinguished from
prior rights initiatives: unlike prior movements, the earliest authority
in this instance originated with the federal government (in 1949), not
with the states or local communities. Prior to the more substantial
enactment in 1985 of the prohibition on discrimination by private
landlords, only a small group of states had equivalent protection.33 9
Notably, by contrast, the civil rights and fair housing movements
were just that-movements. They began as state and local initiatives
that grew into federal initiatives largely because certain parts of the
336. See Witherspoon, supra note 322, at 1171.
337. See Pearl & Terner, supra note 323, at 884.
338. For example, California's Rumford Fair Housing Act, 1963 Cal. Stat. 1853, for-
bade local fair housing laws. Pearl & Terner, supra note 323, at 852-53.
339. See supra notes 174-222 and accompanying text.
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nation were not meeting what grew to be a national norm. Both ex-
hibited elements of the dual cooperative and dialogic approach-verti-
cally and horizontally-whereby federal legislators drew on state and
local efforts to justify their advocacy in Congress.
Why did housing discrimination against low-income residents fol-
low a different path? Why did it not percolate upwards through an
instrumental use of the federal system? One reason may be the
strength of the landlord lobby at the national level. Though states
and localities are often able to overcome landlord lobbies where they
may advocate against discriminatory protections, their strength in
Congress at the time of the repeal of the federal statute was over-
whelming. Further, their voices were amplified by the executive
branch under another rationale for repeal: growth of the housing pro-
gram. In essence, the federal and state levels were simply identifying
different problems from their respective vantage points. The federal
housing authority endeavored to engage more landlords in the pro-
gram, while the state endeavored to get more tenants in the housing
units that were available. These need not be exclusionary goals
though so far we have yet to see their cooperation on this point.
A second reason may be the lack of a strong constituency or social
movement either at the grassroots level or among transnational orga-
nizations of government actors (TOGAs, in the words of Judith Res-
nik, Joseph Frueh, and Joshua Civin 34 )-transborder collaborations
among mayors or state and city legislators. Elected officials may be
reluctant or unable to support such a move in light of their need for
reelection as single actors-elections in which real estate owners may
play a large role, thus paralyzing action on the part of the executive or
the legislature.
Regardless of these distinctions, it is in any case difficult to justify
an argument for the distribution of authority to one of the levels on
the basis of history in this case when civil rights issues themselves
ricocheted back and forth across several levels.341 Still, the movement
may stand for a larger principle according to which social and civil
rights are recognized as unique sets of policies for which "default" is
an unacceptable second-best. The civil rights movement demonstrates
the need for at least some sort of uniform federal threshold-a mini-
mum set of rights to serve as a floor upon which states and localities
may build additional protections in a way that would bridge the ideo-
logical posturing underlying discussions of federalism.
340. See Resnik, Civin & Frueh, supra note 26, at 709.
341. James Blumstein notes how "the federalism deal... empowers local communi-
ties, but it also constrains local power regarding civil rights by the superior authority of
the federal government." Blumstein, supra note 24, at 1272.
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B. POLITICS OR PRINCIPLES
Larry Kramer makes reference to the way in which scholarly and
judicial discussion about federalism is like the proverbial "blind m[a]n
trying to describe an elephant."342 The academic literature is replete
with accounts of the functions of federalism and how the Constitution
or the Founding Fathers envisioned its operation.343 Scholars draw
our attention to federalism's promotion of choice, competition, partici-
pation, experimentation, and the diffusion of power.344 The judiciary
highlights them as readily as the academic community.345 These fed-
eralism values are not intended to be ideologically centered, though
they are often cast in that light. Heather Gerken comments on how
"federal-state interactions take place in areas where states and the
federal government possess concurrent jurisdiction, with states often
administering federal programs."346 More often than not, policymak-
ers from each level of government collaborate within the system
rather than as independent actors outside of it.34 7 And both scholars
and politicians can acknowledge the descriptive point Gerken makes
that many aspects of American life are governed by programs requir-
ing concerted action.
Still, the political undertones of discussion about distribution of
authority are salient in the discourse of everyday policymaking and all
the more so when it comes to unclaimed issue areas of overlapping
sovereignty. The menu discussed above is intended to be apolitical,
though its employment and ultimate outcome are politically laden.
Some scholars outrightly reject the availability of a diverse set of ap-
proaches on the premise that what is not enumerated is not up for
342. Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485
(1994).
343. In this respect, many make note that when the Founders drafted the Constitu-
tion, an "entrenched localism" was the "preeminant factor" in American life. R. Kent
Newmyer, John Marshall, Political Parties, and the Origins of Modern Federalism, in
FEDERALISM: STUDIES IN HISTORY, LAw, AND POLICY: PAPERS FROM THE SECOND BERKE-
LEY SEMINAR ON FEDERALISM 17, 17 (Harry N. Scheiber & Theodore Correl eds., 1988).
344. See Richard Briffault, "What about the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns
in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1312 (1994) (collecting cites); Vicki
C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111
HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2213-14 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Con-
verse-1983" in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1230-43 (1994); Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-63 (2004); Michael W. McCon-
nell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-511
(1987); see generally Hills, supra note 15.
345. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
346. Gerken, supra note 23, at 12-13.
347. Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Fed-
eralism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 354 (1985) ("States may have rights, pow-




negotiation but rather is necessarily decentralized. Kramer, for one,
insists that the goal of federalism is to "preserve the regulatory au-
thority of state and local institutions to legislate policy choices. "13
4 s
The oft-cited "states as laboratories" metaphor is often meant to
imply the possibility or the intention on the part of its proponents that
experimental policies taken up by states would then lay the ground-
work for the growth of a national norm.3 49 The states act as testing
grounds for the potential national policy. Likewise, the same has been
said of cities as laboratories for state policy in recent scholarship.3 50
This instrumentalist conception of federalism traditionally associated
with progressive politics sees states and localities as stepping stones
to the centralization of a national solution, in contrast with the tradi-
tional federalist or conservative conception in which the state policies
are ends in themselves and diversity among them is valued.
The variable history of source-of-income antidiscrimination mea-
sures provides insight for understanding the limits and assumptions
of previous models of federalism, and the approaches I have outlined,
as well. I use the terms "default localism" and "progressive federal-
ism" to capture the approach that has been applied in the source-of-
income antidiscrimination phenomenon. Both are intended to depict
the same phenomenon, but the framing is reflective of both politics
and policy-making.
First, "progressive federalism" could imply that the state and lo-
cal levels are ideal for certain policies as they provide more opportuni-
ties to enhance democratic decision-making, civic participation, and
are more responsive to the needs of the community, among other rea-
sons.351 The progressive federalist takes the position that, where the
348. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safegaurds of Fed-
eralism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000); but see Two Cheers for Process Federalism,
supra note 24, at 1358 n.42, 1385 (arguing that the inability of the state to "control the
local telephone market, provide tort remedies for injured citizens, and prevent oil spills
in crucial waterways" are "from the standpoint of state regulatory authority ... losses
border[ing] on the disastrous") (emphasis added). Much of Young's work is intended to
show that the Court's jurisprudence-its emphasis on "hard" protections of state power
rather than "soft" ones, its rulings on sovereignty that only ensure that the federal gov-
ernment leaves the states alone-does not promote what Young thinks to be the core
value of federalism: ensuring that states "have meaningful things to do." The Rehnquist
Court's Two Federalisms, upra note 344, at 52.
349. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Evolving Understandings of American Feder-
alism: Some Shifting Parameters, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 635, 669-71 (2006).
350. See, e.g., Shanna Singh, Note, Brandeis's Happy Incident Revisited: U.S. Cities
as the New Laboratories of International Law, 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 537, 545,
548-49 (2005).
351. See The Progressive City, supra note 46, 45-46.
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origin of authority is otherwise uncertain, the best allocation of power
for making the determination whether to protect voucher holders
grants the subfederal governments the decision-making authority.
"Default localism," on the other hand, denotes that in this policy
area, the federal government has failed to act, and local or state action
serves as the "default" or "back-up" option. The legislation in conten-
tion should be federal, but it has been lost or would be blocked if at-
tempted. Here, the impetus of state and local action is traced to a
perception that the federal government has neglected important policy
areas.
There are meaningful consequences to the approach taken, de-
pending on the politics and characteristics of the issue. The interac-








definition 1 definition 2
The diagram shows where the reference to "default localism" as-
signs an ideal starting position for a policy, with the understanding
that through the processes of advocacy or devolution some responsibil-
ities are able to be shared across multiple levels of governance in an
approximation to real policymaking. In between, I have labeled the
zone as "states as laboratories" to indicate where development and
testing might take place and also where, as in this situation, indeter-
minacy perpetuates a "non-directional" or static middle ground. Re-
gardless of the starting point, norm diffusion is likely to occur, but the
agenda-setting position is critical for directing the tenor of the policy.
Robert Schapiro promotes progressive federalism among state
and local communities, though he offers that not all laws are created
equal for this purpose.3 52 As discussed below, antidiscrimination
measures are distinct from regulatory issues like health care, pollu-
352. See generally Schapiro, supra note 27.
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tion, and pro-worker policies cited by scholars like David Barron.3 5 3
Rather, "[i]mplementation of human rights should not depend on the
discretion of [the] individual states .... The realization of human
rights should not depend on accidents of geography."35 4 While it is
not surprising that landlord lobbies have significant clout at the na-
tional level, does that relegate all tenant advocacy efforts to the local
level, by default? Aggregate translocalism is never entirely compre-
hensive in application-some locales are left out. Progressive federal-
ists respond that the democratic features of localism allow for more
ownership over outcomes.
Are these positions, which map easily onto the menu presented at
the outset of the Article, so ideologically entrenched that anything
short of a national norm is likened to ideological "settling" for progres-
sives? Or can the default localism that has resulted be conceptualized,
and therefore accepted, as progressively federalist?
Local government activity in low-income housing discrimination
emerged in the 1970s, though similar antidiscrimination provisions in
other areas are well-known.35 5 While these initiatives in particular
have emerged from progressive social movements, not all local govern-
ment activism has been politically progressive.35 6 For example, many
local actions-both city and county-and some state action concerning
immigration are aimed at enhancing laws against unauthorized immi-
grants, and similar examples can be found in the areas of land-use
regulations and firearm promotions as well.357
Others before me have noted how these municipal policy develop-
ments and their interplay in both courts and legislative dialogue draw
into question the relationship between progressivism and decentrali-
zation. :Schragger identifies two complications-one historical and
one ideological. First, "in the twentieth century, the rhetoric of local
and state autonomy has primarily been used by conservatives to at-
353. See infra note 362 and accompanying text.
354. Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, 3
HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 33, 52 (2009).
355. See Witherspoon, supra note 322, at 1178; Risa Goluboff, Civil Rights History
Before, and Beyond, Brown, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND
PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, PAPERS FROM THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN PUBLIC INTER-
EST PROGRAM COLLOQUIUM 11 (Kathleen Claussen, et al. eds., 2009), available at http:ll
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/liman whyTheLocalMatters.pdf.
356. See Goluboff, supra note 355, at 13-19 (discussing Jim Crow laws).
357. See Richard Briffault, Local Leadership and National Issues, in WHY THE Lo-
CAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY, PAPERS FROM
THE ELEVENTH ANNUAL LIMAN PUBLIC INTEREST PROGRAM COLLOQUIUM 67 (Kathleen




tack progressive legislation at the national level."3 58 Second, as as-
serted above, progressives often view local policymaking as a second-
best solution to large-scale problems. The common view is that "fed-
eral legislation is necessary to prevent sub-national governments from
racing to the bottom in social and economic policy, or that, even absent
a race to the bottom, local regulation is an imperfect or partial ap-
proach to large-scale problems that can only be handled at a national
or global scale."
359
Schapiro, Barron, and others labeled the recent evolution of state
and local progressive lawmaking in many policy areas as "blue state
federalism."36 0 They describe how states and cities are "becoming ac-
tively engaged" in areas where they share overlapping authority with
the federal government such as education, immigration, and health
care.36 1 According to Schapiro and Barron, states are "prodding the
federal government into action," demonstrating the potential of feder-
alism to advance significant progressive goals.36 2 Likewise, Schrag-
ger notes how the urban-based reforms of the Progressive Era serve as
a useful model for today's political left.363 They remind us that "the
rhetoric of decentralization" is not-and should not be-the sole prov-
ince of states' rights activists and conservatives.
36 4
C. SELECTING FROM THE MENU
If one then separates one's thinking from the politically imbued
discourse in this area, this project asks: what should determine how
(or which approach from the menu should apply) to distribute power
in areas of overlapping sovereignty generally, if it is possible to de-
velop generic criteria? For discrimination in particular, one should
consider whether social and civil rights constitute a special case due to
the higher stakes they pose.
Richard Briffault makes note of the contexts in which local inno-
vation may be most salient, and acknowledges that local experimenta-
tion may also demonstrate that local solutions are best:
The case for local autonomy is strongest when the upper
levels of government are inactive, whether because the issue
358. See The Progressive City, supra note 46, at 39-40; see also Richard C. Schrag-
ger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a
Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542 (2006).
359. The Progressive City, supra note 46, at 40.
360. For a discussion, see, contributions to 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. (2009).
361. See e.g., Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New Blue Federalism, supra note 354,
at 51.
362. Id.; see generally David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the
Crossroads, 3 HARv. L. & POL'y REv. 1 (2009).
363. See The Progressive City, supra note 46, at 43.
364. See id. at 42.
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in question is particularly pressing in some localities but not
especially salient elsewhere; because the upper levels of gov-
ernment are hobbled by political conflicts over the issue; or
because of uncertainty over just how to address the issue and
over whether a uniform state or national treatment is appro-
priate or required .... Different actions by different locali-
ties can enable policy analysts to assess the costs and benefits
of different approaches and judge which would work better
for the state or the nation, or whether varying treatments
would be better still.
365
As discussed above, antidiscrimination laws have found two
homes-the first, prohibiting discrimination by public authorities,
was situated in the organic housing program law itself. The discus-
sion in Part II articulated how national housing policy has never been
strictly national and has gradually devolved since its highly national
creation at the time of the New Deal. The strategy of the national
housing policy has been to vest in 3,900 independent, localized public
housing agencies "the maximum amount of responsibility and flexibil-
ity in program administration."3 66 This creates a relationship of reli-
ance and, by necessity, cooperation in which obtaining continued
funding for local programming is dependent upon responsible admin-
istration of the program, which, in turn, requires some reasonable
level of flexibility in local administration. Still, in cooperative fashion,
the housing system employs all facets of the country's federalist struc-
ture by creating an elaborate tri-level administrative scheme. Since
its inception, the national housing policy has affirmed its commitment
"to provide financial assistance to the States and political subdivi-
sions thereof" in meeting their own housing needs.3 67 This language
leaves ambiguous the top-down or bottom-up determination of public
housing policy. As a result, many reforms to housing legislation over
365. See Briffault, supra note 357, at 79. Briffault goes on to argue as follows:
There is increasing evidence that large-scale social and economic problems can
be addressed at the local and state levels, that races to the bottom are not a
necessary corollary to federalism, and that national regulation might be more
likely to favor large-scale corporate interests than the kinds of constituencies
progressives often care about .... No doubt there are races to the bottom in
some areas; but there are also races to the top. Nor should decentralized law-
making be considered a second-best solution to national problems. The local-
ness of regulatory initiatives is their greatest strength .... [W]e are now quite
(healthfully) skeptical that any of those problems are susceptible to a single
national solution.
Id. at 42-43. These are not just twenty-first-century accounts. See also Felix Frank-
furter, THE PUBLIC AND ITs GOVERNMENT 49-50 (1930) ("[O]ur federalism calls for the
free play of local diversity in dealing with local problems."); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 493 (1954).
366. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a)(1)(C) (2006).
367. United States Housing Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-412, 50 Stat. 888 pmbl.
(1937) (codified and omitted at 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1974)).
[Vol. 48
2015] DEFAULT LOCALISM
the years have struggled with achieving an appropriate balance in the
distribution of power between federal and local authorities, particu-
larly where federal activity has significant local repercussions.
368
Where possible, however, the federal policy commitment has set a
tone or expectation for collaboration and communication.
The approach adopted for addressing overlapping sovereignty in
antidiscrimination is particularly complicated because it has been
problematized through a partly unconscious decentralization-a mis-
take in the course of reform that no one, not even housing advocates,
noticed. On the one hand, devolution of housing antidiscrimination
policy leads to the operation of a federal program that lacks opera-
tional assurance for those it is purportedly intended to benefit that
they will in fact be able to benefit from the program; from another
perspective, however, one might view the de facto decentralization as
both appropriate and useful since discriminatory behavior is highly
localized. Its experience teaches us subsidiary lessons regarding ways
in which to leverage the comparative advantages of each level of the
368. For example, when HUD instituted its Moving to Opportunity program in the
early 1990s, in which selected cities would receive grants to combine tenant-based
rental assistance with housing counseling to help very low-income families move from
poverty-stricken urban areas to low-poverty neighborhoods, backlash from local home-
owners in Maryland was felt in downtown Washington, D.C. According to one congres-
sional aide: "The truth is local pols up for re-election successfully politicized MTO."
Laurie Abraham, Foes Kill Housing Plan Funds, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 15, 1994), http:/farti-
cles.chicagotribune.com/1994-12-15/news/9412150065-1 mto-mikulski-gautreaux. This
advocacy led to an effort to strip $171 million from the program. Id.
In recent years, Congress has continued to press for increased devolution and der-
egulation in its rhetoric, while its administrative processes have required federal-local
government interaction, suggesting that Congress intends to maintain tight control
over the policy as a whole. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between the
structural housing policy which operates through regulatory pronouncements and block
grants and discrimination. These two are not the same and should not be conflated. In
other words, just because the devolution-oriented tri-level structure works for the
programmatic side of housing does not mean it should be adopted for discrimination
provisions or that housing discrimination measures should be integrated in the organic
program statute, as has been done by some states.
To be sure, federal statutes on Section 8 programming generally leave selection of
tenants to the discretion of the property owner. Section 1437t(d)(1)(A) provides that
contracts for assistance payments between a public housing agency and a rental prop-
erty owner must allow that the "selection of tenants ... be the function of the owner"
with the exception of a few programs under which the "agency may establish local pref-
erences." It also includes an exception that does not allow property owners to deny
admission to "victim[s] of domestic violence, dating violence or stalking" on the basis of
the individual's victimization if the applicant otherwise qualifies. Id. But nowhere does
it require landlords to take Section 8 voucher holders as tenants. This point is reem-
phasized in the subsection on vouchers, under the heading "Selection of tenants": "Each
housing assistance payment contract entered into by the public housing agency and the
owner of a dwelling unit[ I shall provide that the screening and selection of families for
those units shall be the function of the owner." 42 U.S.C. § 14370o)(6)(B). Thus, the
housing program provides little assistance for responding to the normative inquiry on
power distribution for antidiscrimination measures.
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federalist system and about where the political capital for particular
groups lies.
Where does this leave policymakers seeking comprehensive ef-
fect? With respect to antidiscrimination policies, a more communica-
tive approach could facilitate a middle ground that would maximize
the utility of the federalist structure3 69 and cross the ideological di-
vide. The haphazardness of the default approach makes it less attrac-
tive, particularly as applied to social and civil rights-whether
conservative or progressive. In the housing discrimination context,
the absence of federal protection cannot be resolved without a means
through which to create that dialogue. Kathleen and Ned Sebelius
suggest he creation of a commission to advance this type of communi-
cation.370 Such a commission may become unwieldy, but it would at
the very least realize an otherwise abstract vision for enhanced coop-
erative federalism.3 71 For an overlap issue like antidiscrimination to
move toward the communication approach requires a mechanism for
dialogue, political will, and some trigger to discourse, which need not
reach the level of social movement, but which should prompt
lawmakers to communicate-if not act. Then, through a more com-
municative, transfederal approach, a national threshold could be set
in collaboration with the states and localities that have experience in
this area. States and localities could then expand the protections from
that federal floor as they wished.
IX. CONCLUSION
As both a governance relationship and a principle of constitu-
tional law in the United States, concepts of ederalism dominate our
understanding of power. While the latter creates some policy areas of
exclusivity, the former enables areas of coincidence and potential col-
laboration. The initial policymaking forum generates considerable
leverage for itself in the norm's proliferation. But are we maximizing
these potentialities?
The states that had antidiscrimination language in place by 1985,
when the federal prohibition was enacted, were few and far between.
Per the way Judge Calabresi tells the tale, it was a Congress-initiated
movement, on the heels of cries for more protection after the original
369. Cf Schapiro, supra note 27, at 283 (detailing Schapiro's vision of federalism
"achiev[ing] its goals" through interaction among the state and national levels).
370. See Kathleen Sebelius & Ned Sebelius, Bearing the Burden of the Beltway:
Practical Realities of State Government and Federal-State Relations in the Twenty-First
Century, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 9, 31 (2009).
371. There is notably some debate as to whether cooperative federalism is a good




fair housing law came into effect in 1968.372 By the time the law was
suggested in 1985, only a handful of cities across the country, and only
four states-Massachusetts, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Maine-had
the law on the books.3 73 However, soon after the federal law went into
effect, it was already under challenge. Within the first five years, a
half dozen federal courts found it impossible to satisfy the conditions
set forth in the law-rendering it meaningless and prompting congres-
sional action to repeal the law. In spite of these developments, some
judges saw a different purpose in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t) and tried to im-
bue their holdings with that spirit; but it would come too late.
374
Judge Calabresi's impassioned dissent in 1998 illustrates this attempt
to bring back meaning to the law.3 75 At that time, however, the law
had already been amended. Meanwhile, states and localities pressed
forward, acting singly-sometimes by looking to a sister city, but gen-
erally at the urging of local advocates, with limited means for engag-
ing in transfederal dialogue.
Although the new federalism scholarship celebrates the increas-
ingly frequent coincidental or even centripetal action3 76 by states, lo-
calities, and the federal government to address pressing policy
matters with an impact at all three levels and beyond, the low-income
housing discrimination experience does not fall neatly into any of the
models. In the absence of communication or assignment, antidis-
crimination provisions remain localized by default. At this time of un-
certainty about where the law will take us, we watch with anticipation
to learn whether the default localism that has emerged will establish
a movement to further a shared national goal of providing housing for
those in need.
372. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 174-96 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
376. Gerken, supra note 23, at 74.
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